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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates how to motivate contributions to public informa-
tion goods, characterized by non-rivalry by nature and non-excludability by choice.
With the running example of Wikipedia - the online encyclopedia that grants free
access to everyone and relies entirely on the inputs from volunteers, I present three
designed-based empirical studies that explore how individual contributions are af-
fected by 1) reduction in the number of collaborators, 2) private benefit, number of
readers, and 3) group membership.
Chapter II studies how the reduction in group size affects the collaborative be-
havior in contributing to Wikipedia articles. Exploiting a natural experiment at the
Chinese Wikipedia, we find that the level of contribution and conflict within the
group drop on articles that face a shock, whereas centralization increases. Inter-
estingly, the impact of a shock on activity increases with shock level, whereas the
impact on centralization and conflict is higher for moderate shock levels than for
very small or very high shock levels.
Chapter III examines how the private benefit of citation and acknowledgement
and the social impact from the public goods can motivate contributions from do-
main experts. Using a randomized field experiment, we invite 3,974 academic
economists to contribute to Wikipedia articles relevant to their researches. The
results show that experts are significantly more interested in contributing when ci-
tation benefit is mentioned. Furthermore, cosine similarity between a Wikipedia
article and the expert’s paper abstract is the most significant factor leading to more
and higher-quality contributions, indicating that better matching is a crucial factor
in motivating contributions to public information goods.
Chapter IV examines the potential of team-based approach on motivating indi-
vidual contributions to Wikipedia. Employing a panel data set across over 9,000
Wikipedia editors and exploiting the variations in the exposure to WikiProject due
to quasi-randomness in the association of Wikipedia articles to WikiProject, we find
that joining a WikiProject has a sizable impact on the level of contribution, mea-
sured by both the number and size of revisions. Further analysis on the patterns in
the behavior of WikiProject members indicates that the recommendation of articles
can be the factor driving the impact of WikiProject.
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
The advent and rise of user-generated content platforms mark a transition in how
information goods are produced on the Internet. Instead of having one single pub-
lisher produce and distribute the content, platforms of various kinds – such as soft-
ware development (e.g., Github), photo-sharing community (e.g., Flicker), Q&A
sites (e.g., Stack Overflow), online health support groups (e.g.,BreastCancer.org) –
allow and rely on individual users to contribute.
These peer-produced public goods enabled by information technology, which
we call public information goods, have distinct characteristics. They are infor-
mation goods with free and open access to the general public. Unlike textbook
examples of pure public goods, such as national defense, which makes exclusion
technically costly or infeasible, public information goods are technically easy to ex-
clude by requiring authentication. However, they are provided to the general public
for free. Therefore, public information goods are non-rivalrous by nature and non-
excludable by choice. The differentiation of public information goods from the
traditional public goods is beyond this. Unlike charitable giving where donations
are perfect substitutes, public information goods are usually non-substitutes (e.g., a
piece of code on Github or an answer on StackOverflow). The production cost and
quality of the public information goods depend on whether a contributor is the right
person for the task regarding her interest and expertise.
Motivating voluntary contributions to public (information) goods is of interest
across many social sciences. A large body of economic research has been dedicated
to understanding strategies to encourage efficient provision of public goods since
the seminal work by Bergstrom et al. (1986); Samuelson (1954). Recognizing the
inherent challenge to maintain efficient provision of public goods due to the classic
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free-rider problem, many theoretical and applied work focus on identifying factors
reducing the incentives to free ride and therefore understanding strategies to encour-
age individual provision. Ledyard (1995) and Vesterlund (2015) provide surveys
summarizing results from laboratory experiments investigating effective strategies
to encourage contribution to public goods (charity). In the social psychology liter-
ature, the tendency to lower one’s own effort when working collectively is termed
as social loafing. To understand approaches mitigating social loafing, Karau and
Williams (1993) present the collective effort model, which integrates a variety of
factors that have been shown to play an important role. The three chapters in the
dissertation start with factors that have been shown to affect motives for traditional
public goods contributions in these two strands of literature (e.g., group size in
chapter 2, private benefits and number of recipients in chapter 3, and group iden-
tity in chapter 4) and explore how they can be applied to public information goods
with the example of Wikipedia. Unlike many traditional repositories of scientific
knowledge, such as most academic journals that require individual or institutional
subscription fees for access, Wikipedia was created to provide web-based, free-
content encyclopedia to the public. Ever since its establishment in 2001, Wikipedia
has developed the most comprehensive encyclopedia in history. By May 2018, it
has accumulated more than 5.6 million articles, with over 838 million revisions
from 33 million registered users.
This dissertation consists of three designed-based empirical studies that exam-
ine factors influencing the incentives to contribute to Wikipedia articles. In the sec-
ond chapter, “Shocking the Crowd: The Effect of Censorship Shocks on Chinese
Wikipedia”, along with my co-authors, Danielle Livneh, Daniel Romero, Ceren
Budak, Lionel Robert, we investigate how the reduction in group size affects col-
laborative behavior in contributing to Wikipedia articles. This work is motivated by
the block of the Chinese Wikipedia at the mainland of China in 2005. The qualifica-
tion of the causal empiricism hinges on the exogeneity of the block, which induces
rich variations in the fraction of collaborators lost for each article. We find that
the level of contribution and conflict within the group drop for articles that face a
shock, whereas centralization increases. Interestingly, the impact of a shock on ac-
tivity increases with shock level, whereas the impact on centralization and conflict
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is higher for moderate shock levels than for very small or very high shock levels.
These findings provide support for threat rigidity theory – originally introduced in
the organizational theory literature.
The third chapter, “Motivating Contributions to Public Information Goods: A
Field Experiment at Wikipedia”, is a joint work with Yan Chen, Rosta Farzan,
Robert Kraut and Iman YeckehZaare. Using a randomized field experiment, we in-
vite 3,974 academic economists to contribute to Wikipedia article relevant to their
research and examine the incentives which might affect their motivations to con-
tribute their expertise. The experiment achieves the manipulation of social impact
and private benefit by vary the mentioning of likely citation, public acknowledge-
ment and the number of views an article receives. We find that the matching pre-
cision between the recommended Wikipedia article and the expert significantly and
substantially increase both the quantity and quality of contribution. Furthermore,
the provision of private benefit leads to better but not necessarily longer comments,
which suggests the promise of non-monetary incentive in inducing high-quality
content.
In the final chapter, “Group Membership and Contributions to Wikipedia - The
Case of WikiProject”, coauthored with Yan Chen and Iman YeckehZaare, we eval-
uate the potential of team-based approach on motivating individual contributions to
Wikipedia. Employing a panel data set across over 9,000 Wikipedia editors, we find
that joining a WikiProject - a group of editors who are interested in a specific topic
- is significantly associated with more active contribution behavior. To causally
identify and measure the influence of WikiProject membership, we use an instru-
mental variable approach that exploits the variation in the exposure to WikiProject
due to quasi-randomness in the association of Wikipedia articles to WikiProject.
The estimates confirm that joining a WikiProject has a sizable impact on the level
of contribution. Further analysis on the patterns in the behavior of WikiProject
members indicates that the recommendation of articles can be the factor driving the
impact of WikiProject.
Taken together, the three chapters provide analyses on motivating contributions
to public information goods through various aspects, including the coordination
among contributors, the efficacy of private and social impact, the importance of
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matching between contributors and goods and the promise of group identity. Our
findings provide important design implications for not only Wikipedia but many
other online platforms of public information goods that rely on the contributions
from individual contributors. For example, the analyses on coordination among
contributes can be generalized to Github, where inputs from contributors are highly
dependent; chapter 3 suggests that private acknowledgement can be of promise in
inducing high-quality for content platforms such as Stack Overflow. In additional,
our study also sheds light on strategies encouraging contributions to the general
class of public information goods. For example, the findings on accurate matching
between contributors and tasks in chapter 3 suggest that directing a potential donor
to the charity that she cares most might be helpful in motivating her contribution.
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CHAPTER II
Shocking the Crowd: The Effect of Censorship Shocks on Chinese Wikipedia
Abstract
Collaborative crowdsourcing has become a popular approach to organizing work
across the globe. Being global also means being vulnerable to shocks – unforeseen
events that disrupt crowds – that originate from any country. In this study, we exam-
ine changes in collaborative behavior of editors of Chinese Wikipedia that arise due
to the 2005 government censorship in mainland China. Using the exogenous varia-
tion in the fraction of editors blocked across different articles due to the censorship,
we examine the impact of reduction in group size, which we denote as the shock
level, on three collaborative behavior measures: volume of activity, centralization,
and conflict. We find that activity and conflict drop on articles that face a shock,
whereas centralization increases. The impact of a shock on activity increases with
shock level, whereas the impact on centralization and conflict is higher for moderate
shock levels than for very small or very high shock levels. These findings provide
support for threat rigidity theory – originally introduced in the organizational theory
literature – in the context of large-scale collaborative crowds.
2.1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is now poised to fundamentally transform the way we coordi-
nate work (Anya, 2015). Online collaborative crowdsourcing platforms such as
Wikipedia present a unique opportunity to tackle complex problems (Baldwin and
von Hippel, 2011; Yu and Nickerson, 2011). Shocks are unforeseen events that can
disrupt and even threaten crowds (Cohendet and Simon, 2016; Jackson and Dutton,
1988; Ocasio, 2011). Examples of such shocks include massive influxes or outflows
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of members, platform or government policies, or exogenous events (like the death
of a celebrity) that increase the importance and visibility of the crowd’s work.
A number of studies have explored shocks and threats in organizations (Co-
hendet and Simon, 2016; Dutton et al., 2006) as well as in small groups through
experimental approaches (Argote et al., 1989; Gladstein and Reilly, 1985; Harring-
ton et al., 2002). However, less is known about how shocks affect online crowds,
which often face distinct challenges to effectively respond to shocks (Kittur and
Kraut, 2010; Robert and Romero, 2017). For example, online crowds have a much
more fluid membership than offline groups and organizations, which makes a poten-
tial response to an unexpected shock much more difficult to organize. Therefore, a
shock is likely to have a different impact on online crowds than their organizational
work group counterparts. It is not clear how, or whether, online crowds respond
to a shock. Part of the reason for this gap in the literature is the lack of adequate
instances where the same type of shock affects a large number of online crowds –
a phenomenon that would allow for a systematic analysis of how crowds typically
respond to shocks.
In this paper, we take a step to fill this knowledge gap by examining the impact
of the 2005 Chinese government censorship block of Chinese Wikipedia. This event
presents an exogenous shock to all Wikipedia articles that have contributors from
mainland China, because these articles lose some and in some cases most of their
contributors as a result of the censorship block. Using the exogenous variation in
the fraction of editors blocked across different articles, we investigate the impact of
shocks of different magnitudes on articles with varying numbers of editors.
How do we expect the Chinese Wikipedia community to respond to this cen-
sorship shock? The literature on threat rigidity suggests that groups respond to an
external threat or shock by centralizing their decision-making and decreasing in-
ternal conflict (Staw et al., 1981). Should we expect Chinese Wikipedia crowds to
behave like traditional offline groups? Our study aims to answer this question. We
examine the crowds’ response to shocks with respect to three collaborative behavior
measures: activity, centralization, and conflict.
Our main contributions are the following: (i) We find that the overall activity
level drops after a shock, but the exact drop in activity depends on the crowd’s size;
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(ii) as predicted by thread rigidity theory, centralization increases and conflict de-
creases when crowds are faced with moderate shocks. But surprisingly, the effects
are less profound for more severe shocks; (iii) our findings contribute to the orga-
nization theory literature by providing a large-scale validation of threat rigidity in
a new emerging context; (iv) our findings contribute to the crowdsourcing litera-
ture by providing analysis that could have important implications to the design and
management of crowdsourcing platforms.
2.2 Related Work
Threat Rigidity and Centralization: Threat rigidity is often used to explain how
groups behave when faced with an external shock (Kamphuis et al., 2011; Staw et
al., 1981). This theory suggests that groups will seek to overcome external threats
by increasing both the centralization of decision-making and group cohesion (Staw
et al., 1981). Centralization helps the group better coordinate its response to the
threat during a time when coordination is difficult (Cohendet and Simon, 2016).
Centralization also makes the group more efficient by leveraging its existing work
practices while resources are low (Argote et al., 1989). Increases in cohesion reduce
conflict (Windeler et al., 2015), which further facilitates coordination (Cummings
et al., 2009; Hinds and Bailey, 2003). Both increases in centralization and decreases
in conflict allow the group to focus more on responding to the threat.
Threat rigidity has been found to be consistent with behaviors observed in orga-
nizations (Cohendet and Simon, 2016; Dutton et al., 2006) but less so in experimen-
tal studies of groups (Gladstein and Reilly, 1985; Harrington et al., 2002; Kamphuis
et al., 2011). Other experimental studies found no evidence of centralization under
threat (Argote et al., 1989; Driskell and Salas, 1991).
There are several gaps in the current literature, which our study aims to fill. One,
in the previously mentioned studies, due to the experimental methods employed, all
threats were artificial. Our crowds are faced with a real external threat that could
undermine their long term viability. Two, previous studies employed ad-hoc groups
of people who had never worked together. Threats may not have much of an impact
when members have no real history or future with their group. We overcome this
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limitation by examining crowds with both a history and a potential long term future.
Three, group sizes have had little or no variance. This is particularly problematic
given that previous research on crowds has shown that size is often related to both
centralization and conflict (Arazy et al., 2011; Kittur and Kraut, 2008). We study
crowds of different sizes which allows us to examine the interaction of crowd size
and the effect of the shock on collaborative dynamics. Four, past studies examined
the short-term impact of shocks on groups. Thus, even when these findings show
a link between shocks and centralization it is difficult to know if such effects are
lasting. In our study, we examined the impacts of shocks over a much longer period
– 1 year. Finally, other studies do not vary the intensity of the shock. Groups were
either exposed to a shock or not exposed. In natural settings, shocks are likely to
vary in intensity. In this study, shocks greatly vary in intensity, which allows us to
examine their impacts over a range of levels.
Conflict and Crowds: Coordinating work in large online crowds can be particu-
larly difficult for several reasons. Unlike organizational work groups, online crowds
often lack hierarchical structures, formal boundaries, stable memberships, and for-
mal training (Keegan et al., 2012; Kittur and Kraut, 2010; Robert and Romero,
2015). Additionally, these crowds are typically composed of members who work
at a distance and rely on electronic communication, which further increases the
prevalence of conflict (Filippova and Cho, 2016; Hinds and Bailey, 2003; Windeler
et al., 2015). For example, Filippova and Cho (2016) find that as task interdepen-
dence and geographic dispersion increase, so does conflict in Github crowds. Kittur
and Kraut (2010) examine Wikipedia crowds and find that as crowd size increases
coordination becomes more difficult and conflict increases.
Other studies have focused on identifying ways to reduce conflict in online
crowds. For example, Kittur and Kraut (2010) discover that the positive relation-
ship between crowd size and conflict diminishes when either communication be-
tween editors increases or crowds centralize their work. Filippova and Cho (2016)
find that leadership style and member participation in the decision-making reduce
conflict in Github crowds. Arazy et al. (2011) and Arazy et al. (2013) both find that
crowds with more administrators have less conflict.
This strand of literature offers an important and rich understanding of conflict
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and centralization in crowds. However, it has focused exclusively on conflict con-
structed under stable and static conditions. In online crowdsourcing platforms,
crowds operate in environments that are far more chaotic and susceptible to dis-
ruptions than traditional organizational work groups. In this work, we aim to fill
this gap by studying how centralization and conflict levels in collaborative online
crowds change as a result of disruptive shocks.
2.3 Background
Chinese Wikipedia, the Chinese-language version of Wikipedia, was estab-
lished on October 24, 2002. As of October 2016, Chinese Wikipedia has accu-
mulated over 4.8 million articles, with 43 million revisions contributed by over 2
million registered users. Aiming to provide a free online encyclopedia for Chinese-
speaking users, Chinese Wikipedia has benefited from contribution by editors from
mainland China (20.9%), Hong Kong (26.3%), Taiwan (36.9%), the Unites States
(5.6%), and Canada (1.9%).1
Due to the censorship of online content by the Great Firewall System of the
Chinese government, Chinese Wikipedia had been blocked massively in mainland
China three times by 2008. These blocks denied users from mainland China the
access to Chinese Wikipedia. The first block took place on July 2, 2004, and was
lifted on July 21, 2004. On Sep. 23, 2004, the Chinese government issued the
second block, which lasted for 5 days. The third block of Chinese Wikipedia started
on Oct. 19, 2005. Unlike the first two blocks, both of which lasted for only a short
period of time, this block spanned for almost 1 year and was not lifted until Oct.
10, 2006 (Zhang and Zhu, 2011a).
In this study, we focus on the impact of the shocks due to the third block on the
collaborative behavior of editors of Chinese Wikipedia. There are two reasons for
focusing on the third block. First, it was deployed without any prior announcement
or warning and the Chinese government offered no official explanation afterward.
Hence, it serves as an exogenous shock largely unexpected by editors of Chinese
Wikipedia. Moreover, unlike the prior two blocks, this block spanned a relatively
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese Wikipedia.
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long period of time, which allows us to overcome the difficulty resulting from the
overall sparsity of contribution to Wikipedia.
2.4 Identifying Blocked Users
In order to study the effect of the block on collaborative groups of editors who
maintain a specific article, we need to identify the blocked users. To provide a
reliable identification of the blocked users, we make use of three criteria to de-
cide whether a specific editor of Chinese Wikipedia is from mainland China and is
therefore blocked during the censorship period of the third block: editing behavior,
linguistic patterns, and temporal patterns.
Editing Behavior: We first restrict the set of Wikipedia editors to those who made
edits before the block. We then inspect the edits from these editors to filter out
those who made edits during any of the three blocks – those editors are either from
outside mainland China, and thus unblocked, or have found methods to circumvent
the censorship.
社交媒体
社交媒體
Figure 2.1: Chinese characters for the word “social media”: The first line is the
simplified Chinese and the second line is the traditional Chinese.
Linguistic Patterns: Our second check exploits the unique feature of the linguis-
tic pattern of the Chinese language. There exist two encoding systems for Chinese
language: the simplified Chinese and the traditional Chinese. Among all Chinese
characters, there are approximately 2,000 for which the simplified version differs
from the traditional version. For example, Figure 2.1 shows the Chinese characters
for the word “social media” in the simplified version (the first line) and those in
the traditional version (the second line). Note that the two versions share the first
three characters, but differ from each other in the last one. The simplified Chinese
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Figure 2.2: Traditional character usage: The y-axis denotes the fraction of the edi-
tors of Chinese Wikipedia that have x% of their total characters written in traditional
characters
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Figure 2.3: Geographical Pattern of Traditional Character Usage
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is mainly used in mainland China, whereas the traditional Chinese is mainly used
in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. This feature provides a reliable measure for
identifying mainland China editors, and has been used in related work (Zhang and
Zhu, 2011a). However, Zhang and Zhu (2011a) define an editor as non-blocked if
more than 50 percent of the editor’s additions are in traditional Chinese, a thresh-
old that we ultimately find to be arbitrary. In comparison, we identify the optimal
cut-off from the data. To motivate this point further, we present in Figure 2.2: the
distribution of editors in terms of their traditional character usage.2 The plot reveals
a prominent bimodal pattern – editors consistently use either traditional or simpli-
fied Chinese encoding. In addition, we observe that the optimal cutoff lies closer
to 20%. Next, we demonstrate that the use of encodings does indeed vary across
different countries in Figure 2.3. We produce this plot by considering edits from
anonymous users, whose contributions are recorded by their IP addresses instead of
usernames. This set of IP addresses allows us to map these editors and their use of
encoding to their respective countries.3 The editors from mainland China consis-
tently use the simplified version while those from Taiwan and Hong Kong use the
traditional version. Given our results, we classify an editor as blocked only if 20%
or less of the characters used in their contributions are traditional characters.
Temporal Patterns: While Figure 2.3 justifies the use of linguistic patterns to iden-
tify blocked users, Figure 2.3 also presents a challenge when considering the U.S.
(or other countries with large Asian populations that are not included due to space
limitations). We observe that while the U.S. population consists of both editors
who use the simplified Chinese and editors that use the traditional Chinese, most of
them use the simplified Chinese. Therefore the encoding technique might falsely
classify a large number of editors from the U.S. as being from mainland China,
where simplified encoding is also predominantly used. In an effort to remove these
conflating editors, we also consider the daily editing patterns of editors from differ-
ent countries (Figure 2.4). We find that the editors in the U.S. contribute in different
time frames from those in mainland China. We observe the sharpest difference for
2In this analysis we ignore characters that have the same representation under the two versions.
3Anonymous users account for 78.89% of all editors in our dataset, whose contribution represents
no more than 13% of all revisions prior to the third block.
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18:00-24:00. Based on this finding, we classify an editor as being from mainland
China, and therefore blocked, only if y% or less of their edits are contributed during
this time frame.
In summary, we classify editors who pass the first test (described in editing
behavior), use a traditional character at most x% of the time, and have at most
y% of their edits contributed during the idle mainland China hours as blocked and
the rest as unblocked.4 Given that we have ground truth for 49,051 editors with IP
addresses, we choose the values for these parameters that maximize the F1 measure
when classifying this population. We find that the optimal x = 0.2 and y = 1.0.
This setting results in recall = 1, precision = 0.74 and F1 = 0.85.
2.5 Collaboration and Shock Measures
Our goal is to characterize the effect that the block of Chinese Wikipedia in
mainland China has on the dynamics of collaboration within an article. We consider
each article as a unit of analysis and the set of Wikipedia users who edit the article
as a collaborative crowd or team. We compare activity during the pre-block period
(Oct. 19, 2004, to Oct. 19, 2005) and post-block period (Oct. 19, 2005, to Oct.
19, 2006). Because the number of editors and type of editors affected by the block
varies across articles, we analyze the relationship between the fraction of edits made
by blocked editors in an article and impact on three collaboration measures: level
of activity, centralization of workload, and conflict. We now define these measures
precisely.
Shock Level: Given an article a, we define the weighted blocked ratio Ba of article
a as the fraction of edits contributed by the editors blocked among all the edits
during the pre-block period. This measure quantifies the intensity of the shock
caused by the block on an article.
Level of Activity: We first consider the effect that the block has on editing vol-
ume. For each article a, we let EV prea and EV
post
a be the number of edits of a made
4We also attempted to differentiate between the truly blocked users and those who simply
dropped out by fitting time lapses between two edits from a given editor to a Poisson distribution.
Given the fitted distribution, we determine the likelihood of an editor to make a contribution during
the block and identify an editor as blocked only if the likelihood of edit was above a threshold. This
method does not improve the accuracy and therefore was not included in our final analysis.
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Figure 2.4: Daily temporal patterns in editing across countries and areas
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during the pre-block period and post-block period, respectively. We then measure
the relative change in number of edits as EV ∆a = (EV
post
a − EV prea )/EV prea . Be-
cause collaborative crowds lose members due to the block, we intuitively expect a
decrease in the total number of edits after the block. Previous literature suggests,
however, that efforts to compensate for shock can perhaps prove effective (Kam-
phuis et al., 2011; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Thus, while it is unclear how the
block may impact levels of activity, it is even less clear how activity levels interact
with weighted blocked ratio.
Centralization: It is common for Wikipedia articles to have a skewed distribution
of editors’ contributions (Romero et al., n.d.). Centralization is a form of coordi-
nation, where a few editors take charge of the majority of the work and rely on a
large number of peripheral users to take on minor tasks, and make the crowd more
effective by reducing the cost of explicit coordination (Kittur and Kraut, 2008).
Meanwhile, a centralized article is less likely to be exposed to diverse expertise and
points of view, which could limit the quality of the crowd’s output (Arazy et al.,
2006). Overall, centralization can have an important impact on the coordination
dynamics of the crowd and on the quality of its output.
To measure centralization, we use the Gini coefficient, a statistical measure of
dispersion to quantify the level of inequality in a distribution (Dorfman, 1979). We
let Eprea and E
post
a be the set of editors of article a in the pre-block and post-block
period, respectively, and N prea and N
post
a be the number of editors in E
pre
a and E
post
a .
We let W prea (e) and W
post
a (e) be the number of times editor e contributed to article a
in the respective time periods. We begin by computing the Gprea , the Gini coefficient
of the set {∪e∈Eprea W prea (e)}:
Gprea =
∑
i∈Eprea
∑
j∈Eprea |ei − ej|
2
∑
i∈Eprea
∑
j∈Eprea ej
For example, an article where every editor contributes the same number of edits has
a Gini coefficient of 0, whereas an article with five editors who contribute 1 edit
and one editor who contributes 20 edits has a Gini coefficient of 0.63. We calculate
the corresponding Gini coefficient for the post-block period similarly.
Because the value of Gini coefficient depends on the number of editors and edits
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in the article, we normalize Gprea and G
post
a by their maximum possible values given
the number of editors and edits in article a during the period for which we are cal-
culating. We define the centralization of article a during the pre-block period, Cprea ,
as the fraction of Gprea and the maximum value of Ga given E
pre
a and EV
pre
a . We also
define the corresponding measures of centralization of an article during the post-
block period in the same manner. Finally, we define the change in centralization as
C∆a = C
post
a − Cprea .
Conflict: Wikipedia editors have access to a feature known as reverting that
allows them to undo any other edit. When editors have disagreements with one
another, they often engage in “edit wars”, where they repeatedly revert one another’s
edits (Tsvetkova et al., 2016; Viegas et al., 2007). We use the fraction of edits
that are reverts as a measure of conflict in an article during a given time period.
We let Rprea and R
post
a be the number of reverts in article a in the pre-block and
post-block periods, respectively. We define the change in conflict in an article as
R∆a = R
post
a −Rprea .
2.6 Results
Here we present the results of our analysis on the change in activity, centraliza-
tion, and conflict due to the block. For all subsequent analysis, we only consider
articles with at least two editors before the block, as our goal is to understand how
crowds respond to unexpected shocks. In addition, for all three measures we dis-
tinguish between the articles that have no editors from mainland China before the
block from the articles that have at least one. These two populations are qualita-
tively different in important ways – the former group does not appeal to a specific
culture (mainland China). Indeed, articles from these two groups exhibit pre-block
difference in characteristics that are relevant to our study. The articles that have at
least one editor blocked have 9.06 editors contributing 19.50 revisions on average
before the block, while those with no editors blocked have 4.45 editors contributing
9.29 revisions on average. In addition, the articles with at least one blocked edi-
tor tend to be contentious, on average exhibiting roughly a 50% increase in rate of
reverting compared to the group of articles with no blocked editors.
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mean min max std.dev skewness
Activity -0.2927 -1.0000 46.2857 1.0440 11.9280
Centralization -0.0522 -1.0000 1.0000 0.2169 0.2739
Conflict -0.0235 -0.6667 0.5000 0.1004 0.1827
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the collaboration measures.
Given these pre-block differences between the articles with and without any
of their editors blocked, we provide two steps of analysis for each of our three
measures. First, we compare the change in behavior between the articles with no
editors blocked and the articles with at least one editor blocked. This allows us to
understand whether being exposed to the shock, regardless of its level, has an effect
on the articles. In total, we have 49,945 articles in our dataset and 27,856 among
them have no editors blocked. Then, we examine how variations in the shock level
affect articles that have at least one editor blocked. In short, we find that the shock
negatively affects activity within groups, and that our findings for centralization and
conflict are in agreement with literature on threat rigidity theory.
2.6.1 Activity
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics of the relative level of activity. An av-
erage article has a 29% decrease in the level of activity, with the standard deviation
of 1.044. We first compare the level of activity between articles with no editors
blocked and those with at least one editor blocked. To this end, we regress the
relative change in number of revisions of an article (EV ∆a ) over a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the article has at least one editor blocked, denoted by
IBlocka , controlling for the number of editors, denoted by N
pre
a .
EV ∆a = β0 + β1I
Block
a + β2N
pre
a + a (2.1)
Table 2.2 presents the result for regression 2.1. We see that articles on average
become less active after the block, with a nearly 30% decrease in the number of re-
visions. This might be explained by the reduction in the number of readers, which
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Figure 2.5: Change in editing volume as a function of shock level: The blue curve
denotes the average EV ∆a within articles that were exposed to the shock level pro-
vided in the x axis. 1.96 standard errors are plotted for each point. The green
hyphens indicate the regression fit without controlling for number of editors and
the red dashes indicate the regression fit with control.
reduces individuals’ incentives to contribute to the public good (Zhang and Zhu,
2011a). Specifically, the volume of revisions for articles with no editor from main-
land China shrinks by nearly 37%. Compared with that, articles with at least one
editor blocked experience an additional 3% decrease (statistically significant at the
5% level), which leads to a total 40% decline in activity.5
Next, we examine the impact of various shock levels on the relative changes in
activity across articles. To this end, we regress the relative change in number of
revisions over the shock level (weighted blocked ratio) denoted by Ba, controlling
for the number of editors before the block N prea .
EV ∆a = f(Ba) + βN
pre
a + a (2.2)
In Table 2.3, we report the regression results using both the linear specification and
the quadratic specification for f(Ba).6 To compare the fitness of the two models,
for each specification we perform a likelihood ratio (LR) test of the quadratic model
against the linear model. This shows that the quadratic model does not provide a
significantly better fit to the change in activity than the linear model does.
5The variance inflation factor of the regression is 1.1, which indicates that the potential collinear-
ity between the number of editors before the block and whether an article has any editor blocked
does not severely affect the variance of the estimated coefficients.
6Controlling for lifetime of articles in the regressions does not qualitatively affect the results.
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Figure 2.6.1 illustrates the relative change in activity due to various levels of
shocks. The blue line plots the relative change in number of revisions as well as
the error bars denoting 1.96 standard error above and below the mean. The red
line and the green line represent the regression results with and without the number
of editors before the block as a control. Hence, the discrepancy between the two
regression lines illustrates how much of the change in articles’ behavior is a result
of the size of the crowd. We see from figure 2.6.1 that articles subject to a higher
level of shock experience a larger decrease in activity. Specifically, the regression
results show that a 10% loss in number of editors leads to a nearly 7.5% decline in
volume of revisions for an average article. We further separate the analysis between
small crowds with at most 5 editors and large crowds with over 5 editors. Although
the shock level still has a significant impact on both types of crowds, it appears to
affect large crowds more substantially. Articles with more than 5 editors before the
block exhibit non-linear decreases in number of revisions, whereas those with at
most 5 editors respond to the shock in a linear way. Specifically, when the shock
level is below 0.45, articles with more than 5 editors experience smaller changes in
activity than those with no more than 5 editors do. When the shock level exceeds
0.45, the change in activity decreases faster in articles with more than 5 editors
than those with less than 5 editors. This suggests that the vulnerability of a crowd
to shocks depends on the size of the crowd. When the shock level is low, a large
crowd is resilient toward it. However, beyond the threshold of 0.45, as the shock
level increases, the change in the effect of a shock on activity level is more severe
for large crowds.
2.6.2 Centralization
We regress the change in centralization C∆a over the indicator variable I
Block
a
controlling for the number of editors:
C∆a = β0 + β1I
Block
a + β2N
pre
a + a (2.3)
We find that the coefficient β1 is not significantly different from zero, suggesting
that there is no difference in the change in centralization between the two types of
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Activity Centralization Conflict
Nprea 0.0119∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001)
IBlock -0.0319∗∗ 0.0007 -0.0474∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0029) (0.0030)
constant -0.3691∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0018) 0.0024
The standard errors of the parameter estimates are
provided in parentheses. ∗∗∗and ∗∗denote signifi-
cance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Table 2.2: Regressions of (relative) change in
activity, centralization and conflict over the
dummy variable indicating whether an article
has at least one editor blocked.
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Figure 2.6: Change in gini as a function of shock level.
articles. To further investigate how the level of shock, Ba, relates to the changes in
centralization of articles with at least one editor blocked, we regress C∆a over the
shock level, Ba, controlling for the number of editors in the pre-block period:
C∆a = f(Ba) + βN
pre
a + a (2.4)
We fit both the linear and the quadratic models in the regression, and find that
the quadratic one provides a significantly better fit than the linear model according
to the likelihood ratio test (p-value < 0.01%).
Figure 2.6 illustrates the relationship between C∆a and Ba for all articles (a),
articles with a small number of editors (b), and articles with a large number of
editors (c). We find a consistent inverse U-shaped pattern – that the change in
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Activity Centralization Conflict
Epre 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
B -0.7471∗∗∗ -0.7463∗∗∗ 0.1116∗∗∗ 0.3916∗∗∗ 0.0013 -0.2699∗∗∗
(0.0478) (0.1472) (0.0108) (0.0327) (0.0105) (0.0293)
B2 - -0.0011 - -0.3898∗∗∗ - 0.4430∗∗∗
(0.1900) (0.0430) (0.0448)
χ2(1)† 0.00 81.95 96.69
LR test†† 0.9954 0.0000 0.0000
† Reports the test statistics for the likelihood ratio test.
†† Reports the p-value for the likelihood ratio test.
For each measure, the left column represents the result from the linear regression and the right
column represents that from the quadratic regression. The standard errors of the parameter
estimates are provided in parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at 1%.
Table 2.3: Regressions of the collaboration measures.
centralization tends to increase with the shock level initially but decrease afterward.
Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the parameter estimates for the
regression results in Table 2.3, we find that the break-point at which the change in
centralization begins to decrease is consistently around the point where Ba = 0.5
for the three sets of articles shown in Figure 2.6.7
The initial increase in centralization is consistent with the threat rigidity theory,
which suggests that when groups have a perceived threat they become more cen-
tralized. So what explains the change in behavior beyond Ba = 0.5? We present
the reasoning below.
We now investigate the change in composition of a group – in terms of new ver-
sus old editors – as a function of the shock level. We let Compprea and Comp
post
a be
the number of editors who were active during the post-block period and who edited
article a for the first time during the pre-block period and post-block period, respec-
tively. We then measure the fraction of new editors during the post-block period for
an article a as Compa = Comp
post
a
Comp
post
a +Comp
pre
a
. In Figure 2.7, we show how this measure
varies across articles with different shock levels. The x-axis in this figure denotes
the shock level and the y-axis denotes the fraction of new users (Compa). We pro-
vide boxplots and means (diamond shape) for articles of varying shock levels. The
7The break point is given by −βB/2βB2 .
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Figure 2.7: Change in composition as a function of shock levels.
red line and the green line are defined in the same manner as in the analysis of ac-
tivity. The results show that as the shock level increases, the composition of a group
post-block tends to include more new editors. This suggests that for the high shock
levels, the composition of a group tends to be dominated by editors who joined the
group later and therefore did not experience the shock. In fact, for Ba >= 0.5, the
majority of editors for more than half of the articles are new to the group.
Given the finding on compositional effects, the break point in Figure 2.6 is
now easier to interpret. As we move beyond Ba ≥ 0.5, for instance, the majority
of a group consists of users who joined the article after the shock and thus did not
experience the shock. It is natural that for such articles, the changes in concentration
are not as strong as in the cases where most group members experienced the shock
and hence behave according to threat rigidity theory.
2.6.3 Conflict
We analyze conflict by comparing articles with and without editors blocked in
the following regression:
R∆a = β0 + β1I
Block
a + β2N
pre
a + a (2.5)
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We find that articles with at least one editor blocked experience a 2.2% drop in
conflict, while those with no editors blocked experience a 2.5% increase in conflict.
Given that articles with no editors blocked are not directly affected by the shock,
this poses a conundrum. However, this can be explained once the trend of conflict is
estimated during the pre-block period. Indeed, we find that articles with no editors
blocked already experience a 2.5% increase when comparing time periods October
2004-May 2005 to May 2005-October 2005, while those with at least one editor
blocked experience < 0.001% change in the same time period. This shows that the
trend in conflict is unchanged for articles with no editors blocked, while those with
at least one editor blocked shifts from constant conflict to a decreasing one.
Next, we examine the effect of the shock level on conflict in articles. To that
end, we regress the amount of conflict of an article to the weighted ratio of blocked
editors, controlling for the number of editors as follows:
R∆a = f(Ba) + βN
pre
a + a (2.6)
Here, we consider articles that had at least one revert either one year before or after
the block as this limits the analysis to articles with editors who are aware of the
reverting feature. The results are consistent with the overall qualitative findings if
all articles are included. Note that we also evaluated the fit of a linear model and
find that the quadratic model provides a significantly better fit for the data given the
likelihood ratio test (p-value < 0.01%). The findings presented in Figure 2.8 are
intriguing. We observe that for both small and large articles, small shocks result in
a decrease in conflict. This finding is in agreement with threat rigidity theory, which
suggests that when groups face an external threat they become more cohesive and
hence exhibit less conflict Staw et al. (1981).
Moving from small to big shocks, we find an inflection point – after around
Ba > 0.3, a larger blocked ratio results in a smaller reduction in conflict. As shown
in the analysis of centralization, when large shocks occur, most of the current group
members disappear and the new composition of the team consists of new group
members. Thus, the increase in the change in conflict when Ba is large is likely due
to the fact that most group members in these cases did not experience the shock.
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Figure 2.8: Change in conflict as a function of shock level.
2.6.4 Mediation Analysis
Centralization and conflict are likely to relate to each other. When a group is
highly centralized, explicit coordination is less costly and it is easier to complete
tasks without engaging in conflict (Kittur and Kraut, 2010). We observe that shock
level had the opposite relationship with centralization than it does with conflict.
Indeed, controlling for the shock level and the number of editors, we find a negative
and significant relationship between centralization and conflict. It is possible that
the shock affects conflict indirectly through its impact on centralization. To separate
out the direct effect of weighted blocked ratio on conflict and any indirect effect
through centralization, we conduct a mediation analysis (MacKinnon et al., 2007)
among weighted blocked ratio, centralization, and conflict.
Figure 2.9 shows the model and Table 2.4 summarizes the decomposition of the
direct effect and the indirect effect from the mediation analysis. The only significant
effect that weighted blocked ratio has on conflict is the direct effect and there is no
significant indirect effect through concentration. Indeed, the direct effect accounts
for over 99% of the total effect that the weighted blocked ratio has on conflict. This
suggests that while centralization directly impacts conflict, the observed non-linear
effect that weighted blocked ratio has on conflict is independent of the effect of
centralization.
2.7 Discussion
Through this research we seek to understand the impact of external shocks
on crowds. To do so, we examine the 2005 Chinese government censorship of
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B2 B
Direct Effect 0.4222∗∗∗ -0.2471∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0295)
Indirect Effect 0.0012 -0.0011
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Total Effect 0.4234∗∗∗ -0.2482∗∗∗
(0.0446) (0.0293)
Table 2.4: Results from the mediation analysis. The standard errors of the parameter
estimates are provided in parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes p-value < 0.01 respectively.
Weighted	blocked	
ratio	!" Centralization#"$% Conflict&"$%
Direct	effect
Indirect	effect
Control	variables:	
• Num.	editors	before	block	'"(%
• Num.	editors	after	block	'"$%
Figure 2.9: Mediation analysis diagram
Wikipedia. Results from our analysis provide four overarching findings, which
have implications for research and design.
First, group size matters. Although size is not a key element in the threat rigid-
ity literature on groups, it had an important role in our study. Larger crowds were
able to maintain similar levels of activity when they experienced moderate shocks.
Smaller crowds experienced more dramatic drop-offs in their level of activity. This
supports the idea of resiliency through size. However, the opposite was true when
shocks were more severe. For severe shocks, smaller crowds experienced smaller
decreases in their level of activity, while larger crowds had dramatic drop-offs in
their activity. The importance of size in understanding how groups respond to
shocks may have been de-emphasized in prior literature, which did not significantly
vary group size. However, our results suggest that size is vital to understanding how
groups respond to threats.
Second, in the context of crowds the impact of shocks on centralization and
conflict is not as straightforward as the literature suggests. Surprisingly, moderate
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shocks had a much more profound and lasting impact than severe shocks. In cases
of severe shocks large portions of the crowd were lost and later replaced with new-
comers. The greater the influx of newcomers into the crowd, the less the crowd
displayed evidence of the shock. More specifically, these crowds are more decen-
tralized and have more conflict compared to crowds that experience more moderate
shocks and retain more of their previous members. Newcomers did not experience
the shock and are likely to be less willing to support increases in centralization and
decreases in conflict. Although this finding is novel, it is unclear whether it only
applies to crowds or it could generalize to other settings.
Third, this study extends research on threat rigidity to include a large-scale val-
idation in the context of online groups. As predicted by threat rigidity, crowds
become more centralized and conflict decreased after those crowds experience a
moderate shock. The fact that these are real groups and face a genuine threat may
explain why our findings support threat rigidity while some prior studies do not
(Argote et al., 1989; Gladstein and Reilly, 1985; Harrington et al., 2002). We also
find that threat rigidity in the context of crowds appears to be much more complex
than what we would expect to find in traditional groups. Nonetheless, this study
presents a distinct opportunity to extend the research on threat rigidity in a more
natural setting.
Finally, the results of this study have implications for design. The literature on
threat rigidity suggests that there is not one correct way for groups to respond to a
shock. Therefore, systems should be designed to support sudden changes because
these are likely to fluctuate with exogenous shocks. Results of our study demon-
strate that crowd size, the severity of the shock, and the availability of newcomers
are key factors that designers have to consider when designing systems to support
crowds.
Compared to other groups, crowds operate in uniquely volatile environments
where coordination is difficult and conflict is probable. We examine the impact
of an external shock on crowds by analyzing the effects of the 2005 Chinese gov-
ernment block of Chinese Wikipedia. This event provides a natural experiment
that allows us to systematically analyze the effects of a real external shock on real
crowds. We find compelling evidence that both generally supports threat rigidity
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and contextualizes it to crowds. Our findings can help to inform both theory and
design of crowdsourcing systems.
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CHAPTER III
Motivating Contributions to Public Information Goods: A Field Experiment
at Wikipedia
Abstract
Motivating experts to contribute to public information goods can improve its
quality. In a large-scale field experiment on Wikipedia, we find that experts are
more interested in contributing when the likelihood of citation is mentioned. Con-
ditional on a positive response, we find that citation benefit together with public
acknowledgement increases contribution quality, whereas matching accuracy be-
tween a Wikipedia article and an expert’s paper abstract, measured by cosine simi-
larity, significantly increases both contribution quantity and quality, suggesting the
potential of combining the predictive accuracy of machine learning with the causal
inference of field experiments in promoting prosocial behavior.
3.1 Introduction
Online communities, social networking sites and other online social environ-
ments are increasingly being used to bring together labor and resource contributions
to create public goods. The Wikipedia community has developed history’s most
comprehensive encyclopedia (Lih, 2009). Members of open source software de-
velopment projects have created the software that runs the Internet and many other
valuable software artifacts (Weber, 2004). Technical question and answer sites like
the StackOverflow provide users with often highly specific advice about technical
problems. Online health support groups, like BreastCancer.org and the American
Cancer Society’s Cancer Support Network, provide members both informational
and emotional support to deal with serious illnesses (Wang et al., 2012).
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These peer-produced public goods enabled by information technology, which
we call public information goods, have distinct characteristics. They are infor-
mation goods with free and open access to the general public. Unlike textbook
examples of pure public goods, such as national defense, which makes exclusion
technically costly or infeasible, public information goods are technically easy to ex-
clude by requiring authentication. However, they are provided to the general public
for free. Therefore, public information goods are non-rivalrous by nature and non-
excludable by choice. Unlike charitable giving where everyone’s contributions are
perfect substitutes, accurately matching potential contributor’s expertise with the
right task can simultaneously improve the quality and lower the cost of contribu-
tions. Furthermore, accurate matching can even invoke a contributor’s personal or
professional identity which can also motivate contributions. For example, a game
theorist working on equilibrium selection might find it less costly to comment on
the Wikipedia article, “Coordination games,” than on “Business cycle.” Because of
the expertise he has developed over the years, his contribution quality on coordina-
tion games will be higher than it would be in a poorly matched area. Additionally,
he might be motivated to contribute to this article as he cares about this subject
being introduced correctly to the general public.1
In this paper, we investigate individual motivations to contribute to public infor-
mation goods from several perspectives. First, individuals may care about the social
impact of the public good (Andreoni, 2007). For example, she might be more mo-
tivated to contribute if many recipients benefit from her contributions. Second, she
might care about her private benefit from her contribution, such as being cited or
publicly acknowledged. In addition, we investigate the effect of matching accuracy
between the recommended public information good and potential contributors’ ex-
pertise, as well as the social distance between the contributor and the askers.
Related research on charitable giving has identified two reasons why people
donate to charity: first, they have been asked; and second, they have been asked by
someone they care about (Castillo et al., 2014). In this paper, we add a third reason
which is critically important in the context of public information goods - what they
have been asked to do is important. We use machine learning techniques to match
1We thank David Cooper for helpful discussions.
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expertise with tasks, which can scale to arbitrarily large communities and to any
field with open-access content.
We conduct our study in the context of the English language Wikipedia. The
English Wikipedia was founded in January 2001 and is operated by the Wikime-
dia Foundation. It is among the most important information sources for the gen-
eral public.2 As of the February of 2018, the English Wikipedia has accumulated
over 5.5 million articles, with open and free access to all Internet users. The non-
excludability property of Wikipedia distinguishes it from traditional repositories
of scientific knowledge, such as most academic journals that require individual
or institutional subscription fees for access. Recent field experiments demonstrate
that Wikipedia not only reflects the state of scientific knowledge it shapes science
(Thompson and Hanley, 2017).
We design our field experiment to investigate what motivates domain experts
to contribute their expertise to public information goods. We exogenously vary
the social impact of the public information good and potential private benefit of
contributing using a 2-by-3 factorial design. Along the social impact dimension,
we provide the experts with either the average number of views of a Wikipedia
article or, in addition, a greater number of views which we use as a cutoff for all
Wikipedia articles in our sample. Along the private benefit dimension, we vary the
mentioning of the likelihood of citation of an expert’s research with or without a
public acknowledgement of their contributions.
We invited 3,974 academic economists who had at least five papers posted in
a public research paper repository which we used for expertise matching. We find
that the baseline positive response rate is 45%, much higher than the 2% positive
response rate from a comparable field experiment inviting academic psychologists
to review Wikipedia articles.3 Compared to the baseline, mentioning citation ben-
efit at high view further increase the positive response rates by 6 percentage points
2According to Alexa Internet, Wikipedia ranks among the top five most popular websites
globally, with over 262 million daily visits. See https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/
wikipedia.org.
3In an unpublished field experiment, authors Farzan and Kraut emailed 9,532 members of the
American Psychological Society inviting them to review Wikipedia articles, with a 2% positive
response rate. They manipulated two main factors: who has done the work and who will benefit
from the reviews provided by APS members.
31
(pp), whereas citation at high view, with or without public acknowledgement, re-
duces negative response rate by about 6 pp. Conditional on a positive response, the
matching precision between the recommended Wikipedia article and the expert’s
research paper abstract, measured by cosine similarity, has a substantial and signifi-
cant impact on both contribution quantity and quality. Furthermore, citation benefit
and public acknowledgement together significantly increases contribution quality.
Our findings suggest that precise matching of volunteers to tasks is critically impor-
tant in encouraging contributions to public information goods, and likely to public
goods provision and volunteering in general.
Our paper makes novel and important contributions to the vast experimental
public goods literature (Ledyard, 1995; Vesterlund, 2015). First, it identifies public
information goods as an increasingly important class of public goods and explores
factors which encourage domain experts’ contributions. Second, using machine
learning and natural language processing techniques to match experts to Wikipedia
articles, we identify matching accuracy between volunteers and tasks as a robust
and significant predictor of both contribution quantity and quality. We expect this
finding to generalize to other scholarly communities as well as other types of vol-
unteer activities where expertise matter. On the methodology front, our approach
synthesizes the predictive accuracy of machine learning with the causal inference
of theory-guided field experiments (Kleinberg et al., 2015), representing a new
wave of personalized intervention, analogous to the recent development of preci-
sion medicine (Collins and Varmus, 2015). Lastly, our field experiment has gener-
ated valuable public information goods, i.e., 1,188 expert comments on Wikipedia
articles in economics, all of which have been posted on the Talk Pages of the corre-
sponding Wikipedia articles, where Wikipedians coordinate with each other in the
production process. These comments help improve the quality of Wikipedia arti-
cles during the Wikipedia Year of Science, an unprecedented initiative to improve
articles related to STEM and the social sciences.4
4Our field experiment is neither funded nor influenced by the Wikimedia Foundation.
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3.2 Literature Review
Neoclassical theories of public goods provision predict that rational individu-
als have an incentive to under-contribute to public goods as they do not internalize
the positive externalities of their contributions on others (Bergstrom et al., 1986;
Samuelson, 1954). Numerous experiments have been conducted to test and expand
the theories. We refer the readers to Ledyard (1995) for a survey of laboratory
experiments using the voluntary contribution mechanism in a wide range of envi-
ronments, and to Vesterlund (2015) for a more recent survey of laboratory and field
experiments on charitable giving.
Economists have developed several perspectives to address the problem of under-
contribution. The mechanism design perspective relies on incentive-compatible tax-
subsidy schemes enforced by a central authority.5 Therefore, they cannot be directly
applied to communities which rely on voluntary participation and contribution. In
comparison, the social norms and identity perspective applies insights from theories
of social identity to the study of economic problems (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000a,
2010). This body of research shows that when people feel a stronger sense of com-
mon identity with a group, they exert more effort and make more contributions to
reach an efficient outcome (Chen and Chen, 2011; Eckel and Grossman, 2005).
Since the seminal work of Be´nabou and Tirole (2011), a growing literature in-
vestigates how pro-social behavior can be motivated by the private benefits from
acknowledgement and awards (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009;
Rege and Telle, 2004). In the context of Wikipedia, Algan et al. (2013) study a di-
verse sample of 850 contributors and find that reciprocity and social image are both
important motivations to foster individual contributions. Using naturally occurring
data, Kriplean et al. (2008) categorize the types of barnstars, symbolic awards given
to and received by Wikipedia editors as an appreciation of their work.6 Following
this line of research, Gallus (2016) uses a natural field experiment at the German
5See Groves and Ledyard (1987) for a survey of the theoretical literature and Chen (2008) for a
survey of the experimental literature.
6A barnstar is an image accompanied by a short and often personalized statement of appre-
ciation for the work of another Wikipedia editor. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Barnstar.
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Wikipedia to test the impact of symbolic awards on contribution levels. She finds
that a purely symbolic award has a sizable and persistent impact on the retention
of new editors. Building on these prior findings, our experimental design will ex-
plore the effects of private benefits, such as citation of one’s own work and public
acknowledgement, on contributions.
Another potentially important factor that influences contributions to public goods
is the social impact, or the number of beneficiaries of the public goods. In the linear
public goods environment with voluntary contribution mechanisms, laboratory ex-
periments find a positive effect of group size on total contribution levels with certain
parameter configurations (Goeree et al., 2002; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Isaac et al.,
1994). By comparison, in the non-linear public goods environment, where the pro-
duction function is concave in the sum of players’ contributions, Guttman (1986)
finds evidence that increasing the group size leads to an increase in aggregate con-
tributions to the group, but a decrease in average contribution. More recently, Chen
and Liang (2018) prove theoretically and find evidence in the lab that the effects
of group size on public goods contributions depend on the complementarity of the
production function. In the context of a congestable public good, Andreoni (2007)
finds that although an increase in the number of recipients encourages a higher con-
tribution, it does not lead to an equivalent increase in total contributions. The most
closely related prior work on the effect of social impact on contributions to public
information goods utilizes government blocking of the Chinese Wikipedia as exoge-
nous shocks to the size of the readership, and find that it leads to a 42.8% decrease
in the level of contribution by overseas Wikipedia editors who were not blocked
during that time (Zhang and Zhu, 2011b). This paper indicates that a reduction in
the social impact of the public information good discourages contributions.
In addition to the public goods literature in economics, we also benefit from
the insights, techniques and measurements in the machine learning and natural
language processing literature (Jordan and Mitchell, 2015; Manning et al., 1999).
Cosley et al. (2007) deploy an intelligent task-routing agent, SuggestBot, to study
how Wikipedia workload distribution interfaces affect the amount of work editors
undertake and complete. They use SuggestBot to pre-process a dump of Wikipedia
data to build a learning model of what articles a user might be interested in editing
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based on their past editing behavior. SuggestBot then recommends editing tasks to
users through their talk pages. Their findings show that personalized recommenda-
tions lead to nearly four times as many actual edits as random suggestions. While
Cosley et al. (2007) utilize Wikipedia editors’ existing editing history to recommend
articles, we motivate domain experts who have never edited Wikipedia articles to
contribute, using their publications and working papers to infer their expertise and
make personalized recommendations. Like Cosley et al. (2007), we also deploy a
bot, ExpertIdeas Bot to post the experts’ comments to the corresponding Wikipedia
talk pages to standardize the format of the posts. Our approach demonstrates the
potential of combining the predictive accuracy of machine learning with the causal
inference of theory-guided field experiments in promoting prosocial behavior (Ai
et al., 2016), representing a new wave of personalized intervention in economics.
3.3 A Theoretical Framework
In this section, we outline a simple theoretical model for contributions to public
information goods. While our theoretical framework is closely related to the liter-
ature on voluntary contributions to public goods, we incorporate features of public
information goods production into our model to better represent the context of our
field experiment.
We study the behavior of potential contributors who choose whether and how
much to contribute to a public information good, y ≥ 0. To simplify notation, we
use a single public information good and it is straightforward to generalize the re-
sults to multiple public goods. Let the set of potential contributors be I , and the
number of consumers of this public good be n ≥ 0. Each agent, i ∈ I , selects a
contribution level, yi ∈ [0, T ], where T > 0 is the total resources or time available
to agent i. For simplicity, we assume that the quantity and quality of the public
information good is the sum of individual contributions, y =
∑
j∈I yj . A contrib-
utor’s utility function is comprised of several components. Let the social impact
of the public good be the product of y and the value derived from the number of
consumers, v(n), where v′(·) > 0 and v′′(·) ≤ 0. Thus, the first component of a
contributor’s utility function is v(n)y, which we call the social impact of the public
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information good. Incorporating the social impact of contributions is supported by
the effects of the exogenous blocking of the Chinese Wikipedia on the contribution
behavior of editors who were not blocked (Zhang and Zhu, 2011b).
The second component is the private benefit from the act of contribution, which
could be the warm glow from contributing (Andreoni, 1989, 1990), or increased
visibility of the contributor’s own work, which should be an increasing function
of the number of consumers. The private benefit from contributing can also be
a function of the social distance between the potential contributor and the asker
(Castillo et al., 2014). If a potential contributor is asked by someone she knows, she
might be more likely to contribute due to a number of reasons, such as social image
concern (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011), or social pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2012).
We capture this type of motives by a social distance parameter, s ∈ [0, 1], where
zero denotes that the contributor does not care about the askers, and one denotes
the maximum extent a contributor cares about the askers. We use a specification
that is general enough to encompass various types of private benefit, w(n, s), where
∂w/∂n ≥ 0, and ∂w/∂s ≥ 0. Thus, the private benefit of contribution is captured
by w(n, s)yi.
In comparison, a contributor’s cost of contribution has two components. Con-
tributing yi ≥ 0 entails a cost, c(yi), which is assumed to be convex in yi. Let ri ≥ 0
be her marginal opportunity cost. We assume that her work time not spent on con-
tribution to the public information good is devoted to improving her scholarship or
paid work, yielding private benefit of ri(T − yi).
Crucially for public information goods, we can use a recommender system to in-
fer the expertise of a potential contributor based on her prior work, and recommend
tasks which match her expertise. Letmi ∈ [0, 1] be the matching quality between an
expert’s expertise and the public information good. A good match can potentially
have two effects. First, it reduces the cost of contributions as the expert is asked to
contribute to content in her areas of expertise. Second, matching an expert to tasks
in her domain of expertise might also invoke her professional identity, which could
also increase the value she places on the public good. For simplicity, we focus on
the former and omit the latter. Matching quality is primarily determined by the state
of art of the recommender system. Let f(m) be the probability distribution function
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of match quality. We assume that experts share the same common prior with regard
to the distribution of matching quality.
We consider a two-stage process, participation and contribution, in a similar
spirit as DellaVigna et al. (2012).
The first stage: participation. In the first stage, we elicit the expert’s interests
in contributing to a public information good in her area of expertise. In this stage,
matching accuracy is not realized and the expert forms an expectation of the match-
ing quality, m¯. Therefore, an expert will decide to participate if the expected utility
from participation dominates that of nonparticipation. Those who express interests
in participation move to the second stage.
The second stage: contribution. In the second stage, upon observing recom-
mended task and hence, the realized matching accuracy, mi, expert i decides how
much to contribute to the public information good. The accuracy with which the
recommended work matches her expertise,mi, reduces the contribution cost, c(yi)/mi.
Therefore, the more accurate the match is, the lower the contribution cost will be.
Expert i solves the following optimization problem:
max
yi∈[0,Ti]
v(n)y + w(n, si)yi + ri(T − yi)− c(yi)
mi
. (3.1)
Using backward induction, we first solve the optimal contribution level in the
second stage, and then solve the participation decision in the first stage. Proofs
are relegated to Appendix A. We obtain the following comparative statics for each
stage.
Proposition 1 (Participation). Ceteris paribus, a potential contributor is more likely
to participate if
(a) more people consumer the public information good; or
(b) the private benefit of contribution is more salient; or
(c) her expertise overlaps with the askers; or
(d) her opportunity cost of time is lower.
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In the second stage, after the realization of individual matching quality, we ob-
tain the following comparative statics.
Proposition 2 (Contribution). After an expert agrees to participate, she will con-
tribute more if
(a) more people consume the public information good; or
(b) the private benefit of contribution is more salient; or
(c) her expertise overlaps with the askers; or
(d) her opportunity cost of time is lower; or
(e) matching quality between the public information good and her expertise is
higher, when the marginal public and private benefit is at least as great as
the marginal reputation cost.
These results provide guidance to our experimental design and form the basis
for our hypotheses.
3.4 Experimental Design
We design our field experiment to explore factors that motivate domain experts
to contribute to public information goods. We choose the English Wikipedia as the
site for our experiment as it is one of the best known information resources used by
the general public. We choose academic economists as participants, as we know the
subject area well, and we have access to a public repository of economic research.
In what follows, we present our sample selection strategies, design of treatments
and experimental procedures.
3.4.1 Sample Selection: Experts and Articles
The experts whom we invite to contribute to Wikipedia are academic economists
registered on Research Papers in Economics (RePEc).7 RePEc is a public reposi-
tory of working papers and journal articles in the field of economics. It maintains
7See https://ideas.repec.org.
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a profile for each registered economist, including information about her research,
such as fields of expertise and a list of publications and working papers. The rec-
ommendation of Wikipedia article is based primarily on experts’ fields of expertise.
For each expert, we identify her most recent field of expertise based on her most
recent publications and working papers. Appendix B provides more details on the
algorithm we use.
The initial sample consists of 31,670 economists who maintain a research pro-
file at RePEc, of which 13,261 do not provide an email address or research spe-
cialization. We exclude these experts and reach a sample of 18,409 economists.
To obtain our final sample size, we consider a minimum sample size based on (1)
our power calculation, and (2) what is required by the recommendation algorithm
to guarantee matching accuracy. In our power calculation, we specify α = 0.05,
β = 0.10, and ability to detect a 10 p.p change between two treatments holding one
factor constant. Using the positive response rates from the data in our pilot con-
ducted in the summer of 2015 (N = 142), we would need at least 636 participants
per experimental condition, or 3,816 participants in all six experimental conditions,
in the first stage. To further guarantee the accuracy of recommendation, we fur-
ther restrict the experiment to the 3,974 experts with at least five research papers in
English archived in RePEc.
The Wikipedia articles recommended to an expert are selected according to their
relevance to her research. For each expert, we first use the Google custom search
API to narrow down a list of Wikipedia articles that appear to be the most relevant
to the keywords in the expert’s research papers. Among these articles, we filter out
those with fewer than 1,500 characters. We further eliminate articles viewed less
than 1,000 times in the past 30 days. Therefore, all articles in our sample have a
minimum amount of content for experts to comment on, with more than twice as
many views as the average Wikipedia article at the time of our experiment, which
was 426 views. The average number of views is computed using a Wikipedia data
dump the month before the launch of our experiment.
In sum, our dataset contains 3,974 experts and 3,304 unique Wikipedia articles.
For each expert, the dataset includes the number of times the abstracts for her re-
search papers on RePEc have been viewed in 2016, whether she is ranked within
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the top 10 percentile at RePEc, and the affiliated institution.8 For each Wikipedia
article, our dataset includes the quality and importance class assessed by Wikipedia,
the number of characters, the number of revisions, and the number of times it has
been viewed over the past 30 days.9
3.4.2 Treatments
We implement a 2 × 3 between-subject factorial design in which we vary two
factors in the emails inviting experts to contribute to Wikipedia (see Table 3.1).
Along the social impact dimension, we vary the number of views of Wikipedia
articles. In the Average View (AvgView) condition, we provide the experts with
only the average number of views a typical Wikipedia article received in the past
30 days, which is 426. This information serves to set the experts’ expectation on
the social impact of a typical Wikipedia article. In the High View (HighView)
condition, we provide an expert with the additional information that we will only
recommend articles which have been viewed at least 1,000 times in the past 30 days.
Recall that every Wikipedia article in our sample has been viewed at least 1,000
times. Along the private benefit dimension, we vary the expert’s expectation on the
amount of private benefit they might receive from their contribution. We include
three conditions: a No Citation (NoCite) condition as the baseline, a Citation (Cite)
condition, and a Citation & Acknowledgement (CiteAckn) condition.
The NoCite condition serves as a control and no private benefit is mentioned
in the email. Only the average number of views is mentioned. For each condition,
we send one of six personalized email messages. Each email consists of three sec-
tions. The first section is common to all treatments (with words in square brackets
8RePEc assigns a percentile ranking for each expert based on her number of publications and
citations, and list the top 10 percentile in its public data base.
9The quality scale at Wikipedia contains the following six classes in increasing order: Stub,
Start, C, B, Good Article and Featured Article. The criteria for various quality classes range from
“little more than a dictionary definition” for the Stub class to “a definitive source for encyclopedic
information” for the Featured Article class. The Good Article class is sometimes labeled A class.
The importance scale at Wikipedia contains four classes: Low, Mid, High and Top. The criteria
for various importance classes range from “not particularly notable or significant even within its
field of study” for the Low class to “extremely important, even crucial, to its specific field” for the
Top class. See detailed information at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
WikiProject_Wikipedia/Assessment.
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Table 3.1: Features of Experimental Conditions
No Citation Citation Citation & Acknowledge
Average View AvgView-NoCite AvgView-Cite AvgView-CiteAckn
(426 times) (N = 678) (N = 669) (N = 671)
High View HighView-NoCite HighView-Cite HighView-CiteAckn
(≥ 1, 000 times) (N = 637) (N = 661) (N = 658)
personalized for each expert), starting with a brief introduction of Wikipedia and
including the average number of views of a typical Wikipedia article:
Dear Dr. [Chen],
Would you be willing to spend 10-20 minutes providing feedback on
a few Wikipedia articles related to [behavioral and experimental eco-
nomics]? Wikipedia is among the most important information sources
the general public uses to find out about a wide range of topics. A
Wikipedia article is viewed on average 426 times each month. While
many Wikipedia articles are useful, articles written by enthusiasts in-
stead of experts can be inaccurate, incomplete, or out of date.
Depending on the experimental condition, the second section provides informa-
tion regarding the readership of the articles to be recommended to the expert and
the private benefits she expects to receive. In the HighView condition, we mention
that we will select articles with over 1,000 views. In the Cite condition, we mention
that the articles recommended to the experts are likely to cite their research, ran-
domly choosing one of the following three messages: “may include some of your
publications in their references”, “might refer to some of your research”, or “are
likely to cite your research”. Results from χ2 tests show that the null hypothesis of
independence between the actual realization of the email messages and the experts’
first-stage responses cannot be reject for the Cite condition (p-value = 0.564) or the
CiteAckn condition (p-value = 0.435).
If you are willing to help, we will send you links to a few Wikipedia
articles in your area of expertise. We will select only articles, with over
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1,000 views in the past month, so that your feedback will benefit many
Wikipedia readers.
These articles might include some of your publications in their refer-
ences.
The CiteAckn condition strengthens the private benefit by mentioning public
acknowledgement as an additional benefit. In this condition, the experts are told in
the email message that their contributions will be acknowledged on the WikiPro-
ject Economics page at Wikipedia (see Figure C.2).10 WikiProject Economics is
a group of Wikipedia editors who work together as a team to improve articles re-
lated to economics. Being acknowledged for one’s contribution in the WikiProject
Economics page thus serves as a private benefit in additional to the citation bene-
fit. To avoid potential confound due to the (likely) asynchronous timing of experts’
contributions, we freeze the acknowledgement page to include only contributions
from our pilot phase throughout the main experiment. This way, every expert in this
condition sees the same page.
The last section of the email inquiries whether the expert is willing to contribute
by commenting on Wikipedia articles. The experts are provided with two options:
“Yes, please send some Wikipedia articles to comment on.” and “No, I am not
interested.” Authors Chen and Kraut signed the email with their respective titles
and institutional affiliations. A screen shot of an example email in the HighView-
Cite condition is included in Appendix C as Figure C.3.
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for the pre-treatment characteristics,
broken down into the six experimental conditions. Panels A and B present the
characteristics of the experts and recommended Wikipedia articles, respectively.
Columns 1 through 6 report average values as well as standard deviations. We per-
form χ2 tests on joint orthogonality across the treatments and report the associated
p-values in column 7. Our results show that the randomization yields balanced ex-
perimental groups along most characteristics. However, recommended Wikipedia
articles in the HighView-NoCite condition are longer and of higher quality class,
compared to those in the other conditions.
10See detailed information at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
WikiProject_Economics/ExpertIdeas.
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Experts and Recommended Wikipedia Articles,
by Experimental Conditions
Average View High View
NoCite Cite CiteAckn NoCite Cite CiteAckn p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Characteristics of Experts
Abstract Views 1,610 1,633 1,764 1,697 1,810 1,644 0.493
(1,763) (1,875) (2,637) (2,106) (2,652) (1,764)
Top 10% 0.360 0.378 0.358 0.347 0.371 0.386 0.712
(0.480) (0.485) (0.480) (0.476) (0.483) (0.487)
English Affiliation 0.417 0.457 0.434 0.452 0.477 0.407 0.103
(0.493) (0.499) (0.496) (0.498) (0.500) (0.492)
Observations 678 669 671 637 661 658
Panel B: Characteristics of Article Recommendations
Article Length 34,266 33,973 34,579 36,269 35,000 34,150 0.044
(33,552) (33,194) (34,269) (36,399) (34,875) (33,582)
Number of Edits 725 725 708 754 750 712 0.273
(997) (1,081) (1,000) (1,066) (1,102) (1,036)
Views in Past Month 14,409 14,023 14,013 14,348 14,471 13,934 0.732
(17,086) (19,842) (19,956) (18.108) (19,955) (21,391)
Quality:
Featured Article 0.054 0.050 0.046 0.058 0.047 0.048 0.095
(0.227) (0.217) (0.210) (0.235) (0.211) (0.213)
Good Article 0.216 0.211 0.215 0.226 0.205 0.201 0.120
(0.412) (0.408) (0.411) (0.418) (0.404) (0.401)
B 0.594 0.604 0.601 0.581 0.613 0.613 0.037
(0.491) (0.489) (0.490) (0.493) (0.487) (0.487)
C 0.127 0.125 0.126 0.123 0.122 0.127 0.978
(0.333) (0.331) (0.332) (0.328) (0.328) (0.333)
Start & Stub 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.582
(0.094) (0.099) (0.106) (0.109) (0.113) (0.103)
Importance:
Top 0.168 0.160 0.158 0.173 0.152 0.153 0.077
(0.374) (0.367) (0.365) (0.378) (0.359) (0.360)
High 0.350 0.339 0.353 0.347 0.358 0.348 0.630
(0.477) (0.474) (0.478) (0.476) (0.480) (0.476)
Mid 0.255 0.270 0.256 0.245 0.264 0.263 0.192
(0.436) (0.444) (0.437) (0.430) (0.441) (0.440)
Low 0.064 0.073 0.070 0.067 0.067 0.071 0.664
(0.245) (0.260) (0.256) (0.251) (0.251) (0.257)
Observations 3,924 3,872 3,845 3,693 3,779 3,794
Note. Columns 1 through 6 report average values in each experimental condition, whereas column 7 reports the
p-value testing the joint orthogonality across treatments. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. There are
four articles for which the quality class is unassigned.
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3.4.3 Experimental Procedure
Our experiment consists of two stages. In the first stage, we send an initial
email inquiring whether an expert is willing to provide comments on Wikipedia
articles related to her domain of expertise. The subject line of the email contains
the expert’s area of expertise as identified by Algorithm 1 in Appendix B.
The experts who respond positively (i.e., clicking “Yes”) to the first-stage email
are then sent a second email immediately. This email starts by thanking the expert.
It then presents a table listing the articles recommended to the expert for her partic-
ipation. If the expert is in the HighView condition, the table also shows the actual
number of views each recommended article has received in the past month. For
each article, there is a hyperlink directing the expert to a webpage in which to put
in her comments (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C).
To minimize entry cost so that an expert can comment on an article without
having to learn how to edit a wiki, the webpage consists of a mirror image of the
Wikipedia article on the right side of the screen and a dashboard on the left. In
the mirror image of the article, we disable all the hyperlinks which can direct the
expert to another page. The dashboard contains a textbox in which an expert can
leave her comments on the article, while reading the article by scrolling it up or
down. We display the mirror image of the article and the text box side by side so
that the experts can input their comments without switching between browser pages.
After the expert submits her comment, a thank-you email is sent to her immediately
and her comments are posted on the talk page associated with the corresponding
Wikipedia article by our bot, the ExpertIdeas Bot.11
The experiment started on May 6, 2016 and ended on December 22, 2016, dur-
ing the Wikipedia Year of Science. The emails are sent between 6:00 AM and 7:00
PM on weekdays based on the local time of an expert’s primary institutional affil-
iation. To avoid the emails being filtered as spam, we send up to 10 emails every
four hours. Throughout the experiment, we use a tracking tool to monitor whether
emails sent to an expert are opened. If the expert does not respond after two weeks,
we send a reminder for at most four times. If the expert declines in any stage, no
11See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:ExpertIdeasBot.
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more email will be sent to her. All emails are sent from the first author’s Michigan
email address.
3.5 Results
We first investigate the treatment effects on experts’ participation decisions in
the first stage. Conditional on a positive response, we next explore the impact of
treatments, matching quality, opportunity cost of time and social distance on the
experts’ contribution behavior in the second stage.
3.5.1 First Stage: Participation
Among the 3,974 experts to whom we sent the first-stage email (our intent-to-
treat sample), a total of 3,346 (84%) opened it, constituting our treated sub-sample.
We find no significant difference in the likelihood to open the first-stage email be-
tween any pair of the six experimental conditions (p > 0.10 using proportion tests).
Using the χ2 tests, we confirm that the treated experts in the six treatments are bal-
anced on every observable characteristics (p = 0.561 for Abstract Views, 0.490 for
Top 10% and 0.383 for English Affiliation).
Figure 3.1 presents the proportion of positive responses from the treated experts,
with the error bars denoting one standard error above and below the mean. The
white bars plot the fraction of positive responses in the first stage, whereas the grey
bars plot the fraction of experts who actually contribute during the second stage
which we will explore in greater detail in the next subsection.
We first notice that the baseline willingness to participate is surprisingly high.
In the baseline condition with average view and no mentioning of any citation ben-
efit (NoCite-AvgView), 44.8% experts respond positively to our invitation, much
higher than the 2% positive response rate from a comparable field experiment.12
While there are several differences in the experimental design, we conjecture that
our more accurate inference of the expert’s domain of expertise in the email subject
12In an unpublished field experiment, authors Farzan and Kraut emailed 9,532 members of the
American Psychological Society inviting them to review Wikipedia articles, and obtained a 2%
positive response rate.
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of positive responses in the first stage (white bar) and actual
contributions in the second stage (grey bar).
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line and the first paragraph of the first email might have led to the high response
rate. Comparing the baseline with the other conditions, we find that including cita-
tion benefit in the email leads to at least a 4 p.p. increase in positive response rate
(p < 0.05 using a proportion test), whereas adding public acknowledgment to the
citation benefit does not appear to generate significantly more positive responses.
Along the dimension of social impact, we find that the HighView condition with
or without citation benefit does not significantly increase positive responses (p =
0.959 for NoCite, 0.455 for Cite, and 0.542 for CiteAckn).
Proposition 1 predicts how our treatments might affect expert participation de-
cisions, formulated below as Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood that experts express interests in participation follows
the order of (a) AvgView < HighView, (b) NoCite < Cite, and (c) Cite < CiteAckn.
In the actual implementation of the experiment, an expert can have three poten-
tial responses to our invitation email: positive (clicking “Yes”), negative (clicking
“No”), or null response. To estimate the treatment effects on the experts’ willing-
ness to participate, we use the following multinomial regression framework:
Ri = β0 + β1 × HighViewi + β2 × Citei + β3 × CiteAckni
+ β4 × HighViewi · Citei + β5 × HighViewi · CiteAckni
+BE × expert-level controlsi + εi,
where the dependent variable Ri is an expert i’ response, which can be positive
(1), null (0) or negative (-1). The independent variables include the treatment dum-
mies (HighView, Cite, and CiteAckn), the interactions among them, and expert-
level controls such as the number of views one’s abstracts received (as a proxy
for the expert’s reputation), whether an expert’s primary institution is located in an
English-speaking country, and whether an expert is in behavioral and experimental
economics, which overlaps with the research areas of the research team as a proxy
for social distance.
Table 3.3 reports the average marginal effects estimated from the multinomial
logistic regression. Under the AvgView condition, the likelihood of negative re-
sponse is reduced by 6.6 p.p. with citation benefits (p-value < 0.05), and by 4.5
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Table 3.3: Average Marginal Effect on the First-stage Response
Dependent Variable: Positive Null Negative Positive Null Negative
P(R = 1) P(R = 0) P(R = −1) P(R = 1) P(R = 0) P(R = −1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighView 0.002 0.021 -0.022 0.004 0.019 -0.023
(0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027)
Cite 0.042 0.022 -0.064** 0.037 0.029 -0.066**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
CiteAckn 0.030 0.020 -0.050* 0.020 0.025 -0.045*
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027)
HighView × Cite 0.021 -0.023 0.002 0.023 -0.028 0.005
(0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037)
HighView × CiteAckn 0.017 -0.003 -0.013 0.022 -0.007 -0.014
(0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
log(Abstract Views) 0.009 -0.039*** 0.030***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
English Affiliation -0.020 -0.037** 0.057***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Overlapping Expertise 0.212*** -0.079*** -0.133***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025)
HighView + HighView × Cite 0.022 -0.002 -0.020 0.027 -0.009 -0.018
(0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025)
Cite + HighView × Cite 0.063** -0.001 -0.062** 0.060** 0.001 -0.061**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.018 0.017 -0.036 0.025 0.012 -0.037
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 0.047 0.016 -0.063** 0.041 0.018 -0.059**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Model Specification Multinomial Logistic Multinomial Logistic
Observations 3,346 3,301
Notes. The dependent variable is the expert’s response to the email in the first stage. Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
Average marginal effects are calculated using the Delta method (Ai and Norton, 2003). *, ** and *** denote significance level at
10%, 5% and 1% level. Table D.1 in Appendix D provides robustness check using percentile measures of abstract view.
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p.p. with citation and acknowledgement (p-value < 0.10). Similar results are ob-
tained in the HighView condition: estimates for the average marginal effect is -6.1
p.p. for Cite + HighView × Cite (p-value < 0.05) and -5.9 p.p. for CiteAckn +
HighView × CiteAckn (p-value < 0.05). We summarize the results below.
Result 1 (Treatment Effects on Participation). Under the HighView condition, men-
tioning citation benefit leads to a 6 p.p. increase in positive response rate, whereas
under both the average and high view conditions, citation benefit leads to a 6 p.p.
decrease in negative response rates.
By Result 1, we reject the null in favor of Hypothesis 1(b), but fail to reject the
null in favor of Hypothesis 1(a) or 1(c). Therefore, in the first stage, citation bene-
fit significantly increases experts’ participation interests, whereas social impact, at
least between 426 and 1,000 views, does not.
Proposition 1 further suggests that the experts’ participation decisions also de-
pend on their opportunity cost and social distance with the askers. We use repu-
tation as a proxy for an expert’s opportunity cost of contribution. To examine this
set of predictions, we measure an expert’s reputation by one of three variables: 1)
the number of views for her abstracts at RePEc, 2) whether her overall ranking is
among the top-10 percentile of researchers at RePEc, and less obviously, 3) whether
she is affiliated with an institution from an English speaking country. It turns out
that all three measures are highly correlated. The Spearman’s rank order tests indi-
cate significant correlation between being ranked among top-10 percentile at RePEc
and both of the other two measures (p-values < 0.01). Therefore, we use number
of views for abstracts as a measure of reputation in our subsequent regression anal-
ysis, as it is a finer measure than Top 10%, which is binary. To measure social
distance, we construct a dummy variable, Overlapping Expertise, which equals 1 if
the expert has overlapping area of research with the research team and 0 otherwise.
Hypothesis 2 formulates this set of predictions.
Hypothesis 2. The likelihood that an expert is willing to participate increases (de-
creases) for those with overlapping expertise as the research team (a higher repu-
tation).
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Columns 4 through 6 in Table 3.3 provides the average marginal effects from the
multinomial logistic regression with expert-level controls. Note that the empirical
distribution of Abstract Views is skewed toward zero (see Figure 3.2). To mitigate
the potential impact from extreme values, we apply both log transformation and
percentile ranking (Table D.1 in Appendix D) to Abstract Views in the regression.
The effect of log(Abstract Views) on negative response is 3 p.p. (p-value < 0.01).
The experts who are affiliated with an institution from an English-speaking country
is 5.7 p.p. more likely to decline the invitation (p-value < 0.01). Furthermore,
the experts with overlapping expertise are 21.2 (13.5) p.p. more (less) likely to
respond positively (negatively) than others (p-value < 0.01). We summarize the
results below.
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Figure 3.2: Empirical Distribution of Abstract View
Result 2 (Social Distance and Reputation Effects). An expert with overlapping ex-
pertise is 21 p.p. more likely to respond positively. In contrast, a unit increase in
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abstract views (affiliation with an institution from an English-speaking country) is
associated with a 3 p.p. (6 p.p.) increase in negative response rate.
By Result 2, we reject the null in favor of Hypothesis 2. The experts who enjoy
a higher reputation (and thus associated with a higher opportunity cost) are more
likely to respond negatively. From a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we find that
a one standard deviation increase in log(Abstract Views) is associated with a 25
p.p. increase in the likelihood of a negative response. This result is consistent with
DellaVigna and Pope (2017), who invite academic scholars to predict the outcomes
of a real-effort experiment and document that the completion rate is the highest
among assistant professors and lowest among full professors. Furthermore, Result
2 supports the prediction in Proposition 1 that closer social distance is likely to yield
more positive responses. To the extent that overlapping research expertise implies
closer social distance (Akerlof, 1997; Castillo et al., 2014), our results indicate
that in soliciting voluntary contribution to public information goods, an asker with
closer social distance to the potential contributor is more likely to induce higher
positive responses.
Results in this section reveal several interesting findings on increasing the inter-
ests of domain experts in contributing to public information goods. First, even the
baseline positive response rate is as high as 44%, indicating the importance to ask
and to personalize the ask. Second, mentioning citation benefit further increases
experts’ interests. Third, experts respond to peer solicitation. Those in the same
research fields as the research team respond significantly more positively. Lastly,
those with greater reputation (more views for author abstract) are more likely to say
no.
Each expert who responded positively in the first stage receive a second email
immediately, inviting them to comment on articles in their field of expertise within
a month. Among the 1,603 experts who received a second email, 1,513 opened it
(treated group). In this subsection, we restrict our analysis to this treated group.
By the end of our experiment, 512 experts commented on at least one Wikipedia
article and we received a total number of 1,188 comments. Figure 3.3 summarizes
the number of participants in each stage of the experiment.
We evaluate both the quantity and quality of each expert’s comments in our
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Figure 3.3: Experts’ Responses in Each Stage of the Experiment
analysis. Contribution quantity is measured by the number of words in each com-
ment. To measure contribution quality, we develop a rating protocol following the
standard practice in content analysis (Krippendorff, 2003). Each comment is in-
dependently evaluated by three raters, who are expected to provide objective eval-
uations on the quality of the comments. In our rating procedure, raters first read
the corresponding Wikipedia article. For each comment, raters start with a series
of questions regarding various aspects of the comments prior to giving their overall
ratings. Such a multi-item approach breaks down the global evaluation of the entire
comment into concrete subcomponents and has been found to improve the inter-rate
reliability for the overall quality rating (Strayhorn et al., 1993). The rating protocol
and the corresponding summary statistics are provided in Appendix E.
We measure the quality of comments by the median of the three raters’ re-
sponses to each of the three questions:
1. Please rate the overall quality of the comment. (1-7 Likert scale)
2. Suppose you are to incorporate this comment. How helpful is it? (1-7 Likert
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scale)
3. Suppose that you are to incorporate the expert’s review of this Wikipedia
article and you want to first break down the review into multiple comments.
How many comments has the expert made to this Wikipedia article? (non-
negative integers)
A total of 68 raters participate in the evaluation of the experts’ comments. These
raters are recruited from junior/senior and graduate students at the University of
Michigan who either major in economics or have completed the core requirements
(including intermediate micro- and macroeconomics, as well as introduction to
econometrics). All raters take part in a training session, which aims to reach a
common understanding of the rating scale among them. In the training session,
one research assistant first introduces the experiment to provide the raters with the
background of the study. The research assistant then uses one piece of comment
as an example and goes through the entire evaluation with the raters. For each rat-
ing question, the assistant discusses the rationales for the rating scale and provides
clarifications for the rating instructions.
The raters conduct their evaluations through a web-based survey system, which
requires Kerberose authentication. To guarantee that raters have background knowl-
edge on the entries they evaluate, we assign the comments to those who have taken
courses related to the associated Wikipedia articles.
Figure 3.4 presents the relationship between the two measures: the length of
a comment, log(1 + Word Count), is positively associated with the median rater’s
overall quality. Similar correlations hold between log(1 + Word Count) and the
helpfulness of a comment (Figure D.5) or the number of sub-comments in a com-
ment (Figure D.6), both relegated to Appendix D. The Spearman’s rank correla-
tion between the quantity and the three quality measures varies between 0.663 and
0.682, and is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). Similar positive associa-
tions between the quality and the quantity of experts’ comments have been found
in previous studies in the context of question-answering platforms, such as Yahoo!
Answers (Adamic et al., 2008) and Google Answers (Chen et al., 2010c; Edelman,
2012).
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Throughout the second-stage analysis, we specify the following statistical model:
Yi,k = F
(
β0 + β1 × HighViewi + β2 × Citei + β3 × CiteAckni
+ β4 × HighViewi · Citei + β5 × HighViewi · CiteAckni
+BA × article-level controlsi,k +BE × expert-level controlsi + εi,k
)
,
where i indexes the experts and k indexes the recommended Wikipedia articles. The
dependent variable, Yi,k, is the quantity or quality measure of an expert i’s contribu-
tion to article k. HighViewi, Citei and CiteAckni are dummy variables representing
the treatment status of expert i. The article-level controls include the article length,
the quality class and the importance class. The expert-level controls include the
number of views for one’s abstracts, dummy variables for English affiliation and
overlapping expertise with the research team.
Note that the data on contribution quantity features a semi-continuous distri-
bution with a mass at the origin, as 86.5% articles recommendations receive zero
contributions after the experts open the second-stage email. Such a large number
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Figure 3.5: Average Word Count
of zeros make the common assumption of normality inappropriate and render the
asymptotic inference problematic. To overcome this issue, we fit the data with the
exponential dispersion model, which assumes that the variance of the outcome is
a power function of the mean (Jorgensen, 1987; Zhang, 2013). Compared to other
modeling choices which deal with an excessive number of zeros, the exponential
dispersion model is applicable to continuous data rather than discrete ones.
We first explore how our experimental interventions can encourage experts’
contribution. According to Proposition 2, an increase in the number of recipients
or the private benefit yields more effort in contribution. This gives the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Experts’ comment quantity and quality follows the order of: (a)
AvgView < HighView, and (b) NoCite < Cite < CiteAckn.
Figure 3.5 plots average word count of the comments for each experimental
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Contribution Quantity
Dependent Variable: log(1 + Word Count)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HighView -0.034 0.066 -0.051 0.029
(0.100) (0.214) (0.101) (0.216)
Cite -0.070 -0.086 -0.085 -0.119
(0.096) (0.210) (0.097) (0.212)
CiteAckn -0.069 -0.047 -0.086 -0.086
(0.096) (0.209) (0.098) (0.213)
HighView × Cite -0.072 -0.202 -0.059 -0.177
(0.137) (0.299) (0.138) (0.302)
HighView × CiteAckn 0.131 0.147 0.149 0.173
(0.138) (0.295) (0.139) (0.299)
Cosine Similarity 1.768*** 2.862***
(0.166) (0.359)
log(Article Length) -0.040 -0.059
(0.027) (0.063)
log(Abstract View) 0.053** 0.083
(0.032) (0.069)
English Affiliation 0.095** 0.151
(0.057) (0.123)
Overlapping Expertise 0.373*** 0.742***
(0.099) (0.194)
HighView + HighView × Cite -0.105 -0.137 -0.110 -0.148
(0.093) (0.208) (0.094) (0.211)
Cite + HighView × Cite -0.142 -0.289 -0.144 -0.296
(0.097) (0.212) (0.098) (0.215)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.098 0.213 0.097 0.202
(0.095) (0.203) (0.096) (0.207)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 0.062 0.100 0.063 0.087
(0.098) (0.207) (0.099) (0.209)
Model Specification OLS Exp. Disp. OLS Exp. Disp.
Observations 8,819 8,819 8,635 8,635
Notes. The dependent variable is the log transformation of word count. Column (1)
and (3) report the results from the OLS model and column (2) and (4) report the re-
sults from the exponential dispersion model. Quality class and importance class are
controlled in all specifications. Fixed effects are included. Standard errors are re-
ported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%
level. Table D.2 in Appendix D provides robustness check using percentile measure
for article length and abstract view. The number of observations is the total number of
recommended Wikipedia articles to experts who responded positively in the first stage.
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Contribution Quality
Dependent Variable: Overall Quality Helpfulness # of Sub-comments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighView 0.870 0.899 0.846 0.868 0.885* 0.898*
(0.161) (0.168) (0.157) (0.163) (0.056) (0.058)
Cite 0.877 0.868 0.815 0.806 0.900* 0.894*
(0.157) (0.158) (0.147) (0.147) (0.056) (0.056)
CiteAckn 1.498** 1.565** 1.346 1.432** 1.094 1.119*
(0.273) (0.293) (0.246) (0.267) (0.066) (0.069)
HighView × Cite 1.403 1.429 1.642* 1.701** 1.122 1.139
(0.375) (0.386) (0.439) (0.460) (0.105) (0.107)
HighView × CiteAckn 1.058 1.020 1.239 1.152 1.045 1.008
(0.275) (0.241) (0.322) (0.306) (0.092) (0.090)
Cosine Similarity 11.904*** 14.655*** 3.421***
(7.114) (8.799) (0.636)
log(Article Length) 1.062 1.084 1.074**
(0.110) (0.112) (0.037)
log(Abstract View) 0.957 1.007 0.999
(0.060) (0.064) (0.021)
English Affiliation 1.021 1.132 0.999
(0.113) (0.125) (0.037)
Overlapping Expertise 1.381* 1.441** 1.108*
(0.237) (0.244) (0.062)
HighView + HighView × Cite 1.220 1.285 1.388* 1.476** 0.993 1.022
(0.235) (0.253) (0.267) (0.290) (0.068) (0.070)
Cite + HighView × Cite 1.230 1.241 1.337 1.372 1.011 1.018
(0.243) (0.249) (0.264) (0.274) (0.070) (0.071)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.920 0.917 1.048 1.000 0.924 0.905
(0.168) (0.174) (0.191) (0.187) (0.056) (0.056)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 1.584** 1.596** 1.668*** 1.650*** 1.143** 1.129*
(0.295) (0.302) (0.310) (0.311) (0.072) (0.072)
Model Specification Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Poisson
Observations 1,097 1,078 1,097 1,078 1,097 1,078
Notes. Columns (1)-(4) report odds ratio estimated from ordered logistic regressions. Columns (5)-(6) report incidence-rate
ratio estimated from Poisson regressions. Quality class and importance class are controlled in all specifications. Fixed
effects are included. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and
1% level. Table D.3 in Appendix D provides robustness check using percentile measure for article length and abstract view.
Of the 1,188 comments provided by the experts, 1,097 remains after inappropriate comments are removed. The number of
observations further drop to 1,078 after we remove experts without institutional affiliation information.
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condition, with the error bars denoting one standard error. The average length of
the experts’ contribution ranges between 19.45 and 45.59, though it exhibits large
variations. Along the dimension of article readership, the length of comments is
not significantly different between the AvgView and HighView conditions (p-value
= 0.65 for the NoCite condition, 0.10 for the Cite condition, 0.07 for the CiteAckn
condition, using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Along the dimension of private ben-
efit, we find that citation and acknowledgement does not lead to longer comments.
Furthermore, given the HighView condition, it appears that the citation benefit re-
duces the quantity of experts’ contribution (p-value < 0.05, using the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). The regression results in Table 3.4, which control for the expert
fixed effect, also indicates no statistical evidence supporting treatment effects.
Result 3 (Treatment Effect on Quantity). Neither the social impact nor the private
benefit variation leads to significantly longer comments.
We next examine the treatment effect on contribution quality. The empirical
distribution of median rating in Figure 3.6 demonstrates an increase in the quality of
the comments along the dimension of private benefit. Nonparametric comparisons
among the experimental conditions shows that the median overall quality is higher
in the CiteAckn conditions than it is in the NoCite conditions (p-value < 0.05 for
both the AvgView condition and the HighView condition, using the Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests).
The regression analysis in Table 3.5 shows that the private benefit of acknowl-
edgement consistently encourages high-quality contribution. The effect of CiteAckn
on the proportional odds ratio for the ordered logistic model is significantly larger
than 1. Put differently, the comments from the CiteAckn conditions are signifi-
cantly more likely to receive a higher rating for overall quality. For example, the
estimated marginal effect on the probability of be rated as 6 out of 7 is 3.38 p.p. in
the AvgView condition (p-value < 0.01) and 3.32 p.p. in the HighView condition
(p-value < 0.05) (see Table D.4 in Appendix D). Our results also speak to the qual-
ity measured by helpfulness (see column 3-4 in Table 3.5). Table D.5 in Appendix D
shows that the average marginal effect of CiteAckn is significantly positive (nega-
tive) on the probability that the helpfulness of the comment is rated above (below)
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Median Quality
4. The impact of CiteAckn on the number of sub-comments is positive but weakly
significant.
Result 4 (Treatment Effect on Quality). Compared to the NoCite condition, the
comments in CiteAckn condition receive significantly higher ratings regarding its
overall quality and helpfulness.
In sum, Results 3 and 4 offer mixed answers to our prediction in Hypothesis
3: while the private benefit of citation and acknowledgement is ineffective in gen-
erating longer comments, it consistently and remarkably improves the quality of
the experts’ contribution. Our result thus highlights the promise of non-monetary
incentive, such as public acknowledgement, in inducing high-quality contributions.
We next investigate the prediction in Proposition 2 regarding how the proper
matching between the expert’s field of expertise and the Wikipedia articles can en-
courage contribution. To quantify the matching quality of the recommendations,
we calculate the cosine similarity (Singhal, 2001) between the Wikipedia article k
and expert i’s research work. Cosine similarity is widely used in the area of in-
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formational retrieval as a measure of similarity between two documents. It starts
by converting each of the two documents into a tokenizer (Huang et al., 2007) and
processes them with a stemmer, which strips variants of the same word into its root
(Airio, 2006). After this conversion process, the results are transformed into vec-
tors by the tf-idf vectorizer, which weights by how specific the associated word is
relative to the entire set of articles to be recommended (Leskovec et al., 2014). For
example, the phrase “public goods” is given higher weight than the phrase “mi-
croeconomics”, which in turn is given higher weight than a more generic word
“economics”. The similarity between a Wikipedia article and the expert’ work is
then given by the cosine value of the angle between the two word vectors.
Hypothesis 4. The length and quality of a comment is higher if the cosine similarity
between the Wikipedia article and the expert’s abstract is higher.
The cosine similarity between an expert’s abstract and a Wikipedia article has
an economically and statistically significant impact on the quantity of contribu-
tion. The parameter estimates on cosine similarity vary between 1.77 and 2.86 in
columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.4 (p-value< 0.01). From a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation, we find that a unit increase in the cosine similarity implies 52.52 more
words in an average comment.13
Consistent with the results on quantity measure, better matching between ex-
perts and Wikipedia articles remarkably improves the quality of contribution. Col-
umn 2 in Table 3.5 shows that a unit increase in the cosine similarity is associated
with an increase of 11.90 in the odds ratio of overall quality. This represents, for
example, an increase of 16 p.p. in the probability of being rated 6 (p-value < 0.01)
and an increase of 7 p.p. in the probability of being rated 7 (p-value < 0.01).
Similarly, columns 4 and 6 provide statistical evidence on the positive impact of
cosine similarity on the helpfulness and number of sub-comments. The coefficient
on the odds ratio of helpfulness is 14.66 (p-value < 0.01) and the coefficient on
the incidence-rate ratio is 3.42 (p-value < 0.01). Result 5 summarizes our findings
regarding cosine similarity.
13The change in character length is calculated as ∆(Word Count) = βˆx · (1 + Word Count) ·∆x,
using βˆx estimated in column 4 of Table 3.4.
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Result 5 (Matching Accuracy and Contribution). An expert contributes longer and
better comments to the Wikipedia articles with a higher cosine similarity to her
research papers.
Similar evidence is also provided by Edelman (2012) in an empirical study at
Google Answers, who shows that the level of an answerer’s specialization has a
positive effect on the quality of her answers. Our result on cosine similarity high-
lights one feature distinguishing public information goods from the classic public
goods context such as charitable giving - that the production cost exhibits substan-
tial idiosyncrasy that depends on the matching quality between the specific public
good and the contributor.
We next explore how opportunity cost affects contribution. Recall that we mea-
sure an experts’ opportunity cost by 1) the number of views for her abstract and 2)
whether she is affiliated with an institution from an English-speaking country. This
yields the following hypothesis, again based on Proposition 2.
Hypothesis 5. An expert with a higher number of abstract views or affiliated with
an institution from an English-speaking country will contribute more.
Kendall’s rank correlation τ between Word Count and Abstract View is -0.013
and not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.109). In the exponential dis-
persion model (column 6 in Table 3.4), the parameter estimates for log (Abstract View)
and English Affiliation is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.11 for
both). Similar results also speak to the contribution quality. In Table 3.5, the coeffi-
cients on log (Abstract View) and English Affiliation are not significantly different
from zero in any of the three measure.
Result 6 (Opportunity Cost and Contribution). Conditional on being willing to par-
ticipate, the length and quality of the contributions by experts who receive a higher
number of views for abstract or who are from an English affiliation are not signif-
icantly different from those who receive a lower number of views or who are from
an non-English affiliation.
Finally, we investigate the prediction regarding social distance in Proposition 2.
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Hypothesis 6. The length and quality of a comment is higher if the expert’s area of
research overlaps that of the research team.
A non-parametric comparison shows that the experts whose area of research
overlaps that of the research team contribute comments that are significantly longer
(p-value < 0.01 using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Returning to Table 3.4, the
parameter estimates for Overlapping Expertise are 0.37 in the OLS model and 0.74
in the exponential dispersion model (p-value < 0.01 in both specifications). These
estimates represent an increase of 2.83 and 11.09 more words in the comments,
respectively.
The positive impact of social distance also applies to contribution quality. The
estimates in columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 3.5 indicate that overlapping expertise has
a positive effect on the ratings for experts comments (though weakly significant for
overall quality).
Result 7 (Social Distance and Contribution). An expert with overlapping expertise
as that of the research team contributes longer and better comments.
3.6 Conclusion
Public information goods, such as Wikipedia, have the potential of giving ev-
eryone “free access to the sum of all human knowledge” (Miller, 2004). To reach
that potential, we need contributions from not only enthusiasts, but also domain ex-
perts in various fields. This study explores factors that motivates domain experts to
contribute to public information goods.
Using a field experiment designed to explore both the private benefit and the
social impact of contributions, we find that private benefits, such as the likelihood
of citation of one’s own work, significantly increases experts’ interests to partic-
ipate. Shorter social distance, such as overlapping domain of expertise with the
askers, also increases the likelihood of participation. Conditional on willingness to
contribute, public acknowledgement of one’s contributions increases the quality of
contributions. These finding affirms the motivating effects of non-pecuniary private
benefits in giving. From the large research literature on the charitable giving, we
know that people give to charity because they are asked to do so, and that they are
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more likely to give if they are asked by someone they care about. We confirm both
of these findings in the public information goods context.
Furthermore, we uncover a third factor in motivating contributions to public in-
formation goods, that is, what you ask people to do is crucially important. Accurate
matching between expertise and the task significantly increases both contribution
quality and quantity. Specifically, in our experiment, conditional on participation,
the accuracy of matching a participant’s expertise and the tasks, measured by the
cosine similarity between an expert’s abstract and the corresponding Wikipedia arti-
cle, is the single most significant predictor of both contribution quantity and quality.
This result highlights the potential of utilizing information technology, such as rec-
ommender systems, in promoting pro-social behavior.
Beyond public information goods, we expect that matching accuracy between a
contributor’s expertise and tasks will improve public goods contributions and vol-
unteering more generally. Using machine learning to accurately match volunteers
with tasks is a new and promising tool for social scientists. We expect that there
will be more work along this direction.
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CHAPTER IV
Group Membership and Contributions to Wikipedia: The Case of
WikiProject
Abstract
We investigate the effects of group identity on contribution behavior on the En-
glish Wikipedia, the largest online encyclopedia that gives free access to the public.
Using an instrumental variable approach that exploits the variations in one’s ex-
posure to WikiProject, we find that joining a WikiProject has a significant impact
on one’s level of contribution, with an average increase of 79 revisions or 8,672
character per month. To uncover the potential mechanism underlying the treatment
effect, we use the size of home page for WikiProject as a proxy for the number
of recommendations from a project. The results show that the users who join a
WikiProject with more recommendations significantly increase their contribution
to articles under the joined project, but not to articles under other projects.
4.1 Introduction
Teams, groups and organizations are prevalent in the online economy to moti-
vate and organize the production of public information goods. Classical examples
include Github teams at the software development community1 and Kiva lending
teams at the microfinance site2. The rise of many Internet platforms – whose con-
tent relies entirely on voluntary contributions – has provided a rich set of real world
examples to examine the question on motivating the provision of public goods by
team-based approach. Would team membership induce higher contributions to pub-
1See https://help.github.com/articles/about-teams/.
2See https://www.kiva.org/teams.
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lic information goods from individuals? What is the mechanism through which
teams exerts its impact on motivating private contributions?
In this paper, we present an empirical study that investigates the effect of team
membership on the provision of public information goods at Wikipedia. Wikipedia
was created to provide web-based, free-content encyclopedia to the public. Ever
since its establishment in 2001, Wikipedia has developed the most comprehensive
encyclopedia in history. As of May 2018, it has accumulated more than 5.6 million
articles, with over 838 million revisions from 33 million registered users. Accord-
ing to statistics from Alexa Internet, Wikipedia is ranked among the top five most
popular websites globally3.
The content of Wikipedia relies entirely on the voluntary contribution. To mo-
tivate users’ efforts, Wikipedia introduced WikiProject - a collaboration platform
through which users create and join groups in 2001. A WikiProject is typically
focused on a specific topic and has a set of relevant Wikipedia articles that fall in
its scope. It provides guidance for its members in various ways, such as offering
advices for users and keeping track of articles of interests. Thus, the introduction
of WikiProjects offers an opportunity to explore how team-based approach can mo-
tivate voluntary contributions to public information goods.
Evaluating the causal impact of WikiProject on user contribution is compli-
cated by the potential bias due to selection on unobservables. For example, the
Wikipedia users who are WikiProject members can be inherently more active than
those who are not, introducing systematic bias in cross-sectional comparison. We
deal with this challenge by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in how in-
tensive users are exposed to WikiProjects when they contribute to Wikipedia arti-
cles. Becaused Wikipedia articles are manually classified to WikiProjects by users,
the quasi-randomness in the association of articles to WikiProjects offers a natu-
ral source of variation in the level of exposure. Using an instrumental variable
approach, we find that joining a WikiProject has a substantial effect on user contri-
bution, measured by both the number and size of revisions.
To uncover the potential mechanisms that drive our main results, we examine
how the increases in user contribution relate to the characteristics of WikiProjects.
3See https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/wikipedia.org
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Using the character size of project homepage as a proxy for the number of rec-
ommendations, we find that the more suggestions a WikiProject offers, the greater
the increase in the contribution level of the users who join. This result suggests
that team coordination, which lowers the search cost one incurs to identify the
Wikipedia articles that she is interested in contributing, could be the factor explain-
ing the effect of team membership.
4.2 Literature Review
Motivating voluntary contribution to public goods is of major interest for eco-
nomics since the seminal work of Samuelson (1954) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). To
address the problem of under-contribution, the mechanism-design approach focuses
on incentive-compatible schemes with tax-subsidies that internalize the externali-
ties from one’s contribution (Chen, 2008; Groves and Ledyard, 1987). However,
these schemes are typically enforced by a central authority and therefore can hardly
be implemented in domains that rely on voluntary participation such as Wikipedia.
The social identity approach, in comparison, focuses on inducing pro-social be-
havior by fostering a common identity among individuals. Akerlof and Kranton
(2000b) offers a systematic theoretical framework that incorporates social identity
into standard economic analysis and shows that deviation from the expected be-
havior prescribed by the group leads to disutility. The identity-based model has
since been applied to a large variety of economic contexts. For example, various
laboratory evidence shows that participants with a salient group identity exert more
effort and achieve a more efficient outcome in the context of minimum-effort game
(Bornstein et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2010b; Weber, 2006) and public goods provision
(Charness et al., 2014; Croson et al., 2008; Eckel and Grossman, 2005).
The potential of identity-based approach to induce economically efficient out-
come has also been examined in the field. For example, Chen et al. (2017) and Ai et
al. (2016) examine the impact of team membership on pro-social lending behavior
at Kiva. Using both naturally-occuring data and field experiments, they provide ev-
idence demonstrating that users are substantially more engaged in lending behavior
after joining a team and attribute to the effect to goal-setting and team coordination.
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Similar evidence is also provided by Erev et al. (1993), who show that competition
between teams leads to higher performance in orange-picking tasks. Our study con-
tributes to understanding identity-based approach in fostering provision of public
information goods and indicating that coordination through task suggestion could
be one underlying mechanism.
A large body of empirical works dedicated to increasing user engagement at
Wikipedia. Various factors have been shown to influence user motivations, such
as size of audience (Zhang and Zhu, 2011a), number of collaborators (Solomon
and Wash, 2014), private benefit (Gallus, 2016; Kriplean et al., 2008). More re-
cently, a number of studies provide both quantitative and qualitive evidence on how
user contribution at Wikipedia is related to a variety dimensions of WikiProjects,
including experience composition of members (Chen et al., 2010a; Solomon and
Wash, 2014; Zhu et al., 2012), division of labor (Kriplean et al., 2008; Morgan
et al., 2014), coordination (Kittur and Kraut, 2008; Kittur et al., 2009; Morgan et
al., 2013; Ransbotham and Kane, 2011). For example, Solomon and Wash (2014)
documents the observations from over 1,000 WikiProjects and find that the edits
provided by peripheral editors have a positive effect of the activeness of the project.
Chen et al. (2010a) explores how the age composition of WikiProject members
can encourage or frustrate newcomers. They find that WikiProjects with the age
diversity that is either extremely low (the experience of WikiProject members are
evenly distributed) or extremely high (most WikiProject members are newcomers or
veterans) increases the likelihood that new editors leave. Based on the longitudinal
history of 2,065 featured articles at Wikipedia, Ransbotham and Kane (2011) inves-
tigates the impact of editors’ coordination measured by membership turnover on the
success of collaboration. Their results indicate that the inclusion of new members
helps an article be promoted to the featured article status. Therefore, the amount
of coordination appears to have a curvilinear relationship with article outcomes and
coordination among editors can be especially important during knowledge retention
stage. While all these studies identify various characteristics of WikiProjects that
correlate with user contribution, one common limitation is that they do not deliver
a causal interpretation.
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4.3 WikiProject: An Overview
In September 2001, the Wikimedia Foundation launched WikiProject, a collab-
oration platform that allow editors with similar interests connect to each other and
coordinate their efforts. Both the number and size of WikiProject have expanded
since then and as of May 2018, there exist over 2,300 projects in Wikipedia, with
varying degrees in size and activity. These projects are related to either an area
of topics (e.g., WikiProject Economics) or a specific type of maintanence task that
applies to the entire Wikipedia (e.g., WikiProject Article for creation). The task-
based WikiProjects typically consists of administrators, who are typically granted
the access to perform certain actions at Wikipedia, such as block user accounts and
deleting pages. Because the purpose of this study is to examine how WikiProject
impacts the contribution behavior of ordinary users, we will only focus on topic-
based projects.
According to Wikipedia, a WikiProject is “a group of contributors who want
to work together as a team to improve Wikipedia”. They typically focus on a spe-
cific topic and has a mission statement articulating its scope, goal and vision on the
homepage. For each WikiProject, there is an associated talk page, which functions
as a forum that enables open discussions. In addition, many WikiProjects have its
own project userbox - an emblem that members can put on their userpage to demon-
strate their membership. For example, the userbox for WikiProject Economics is
a supply-demand diagram sided with the note “This user is a member of WikiPro-
ject”. These components constitute a basis for the project membership, which can
foster project identity.
Wikipedia allows any registered user to initiate and join a WikiProject. To initi-
ate a WikiProject, one needs to create a homepage that follows a standard template,
which includes pre-defined sections such as introduction to scope of the project
and a list of participants. When a WikiProject is created, a Wiki link for the project,
which allow other Wikipedia pages to be directed to it, is automatically registered.4.
4Edits at Wikipedia are made through the Wiki markup, a coding language that is designed to
facilitate the presentation of text. A Wiki link is a string of Wiki markup text specially designed to
enable hyperlink across pages at Wikipedia. For a WikiProject, its Wiki link is represented by its
name enclosed with double brackets, such as {{WikiProject Economics}}.
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot for the Homepage of WikiProject Economics
Wiki link has been extensively used by user to join a WikiProject and associate ar-
ticles with a WikiProject. To join a WikiProject, a user can either directly add the
Wiki link of her user page to the list of members of the project, or incorporate the
Wiki link of the project to her user page. To associate articles with a WikiProject,
one can simply add to the talk page of the article the Wiki link of the corresponding
WikiProject.
To increase user engagement, WikiProjects use a variety of methods to motivate
and organize members’ efforts. For example, several WikiProjects designate one
or two articles to create or improve during a collaboration period. Once the target
article for collaboration is chosen, it is in the project homepage and members will
get notified. Zhu et al. (2012) find that during the collaboration period, WikiProject
members increase their contributions by 5 times. Other examples include list of
open tasks and monthly newsletters. These recommendations are usually presented
on the homepage in a salient manner and the Wiki links of the associated articles are
typically embedded. These suggest that article recommendation could be a potential
mechanism through which WikiProjects motivate user contribution.
69
Figure 4.2: Open Tasks Listed at WikiProject Economics
4.4 Data and Summary Statistics
Our original data come from the top 10,000 editors on the English Wikipedia
ranked by number of edits. Wikipedia allows a user to contribute anonymously
and the edits will be recorded with only the IP address. Since joining a WikiProject
requires an editor to have a username, our analysis focuses only on the editors with a
registered account. We also exclude bot editors which are automatic tools developed
to perform programmed tasks. The bot editors are usually involved in maintaining
the Wikipedia community, such as organizing syntax of text and fighting vandelism,
but not editing articles with real topics.
We eventually identify 9,183 editors with registered accounts. The data of these
editors’ contributions are collected through the Wikipedia data dump that archive
all editors’ complete editing histories on Wikipedia. Our data contains 98,584,912
edits over a time period spanning from February 2001 and April 2015. Each edit
includes the editor’s username, the size (i.e. number of characters changed), times-
tamp, editor’s comment (i.e. description of the edit such as adding links) and the
title of the page on which the edit is made.
70
Because editors’ contributions to Wikipedia are sporadic, analyzing the behav-
ior on a daily level can suffer from sparsity of the data. Therefore, we aggregate
the editors’ edits by at the monthly level. Our final dataset contains 821,192 editor-
month observations, which constitute our unit of analysis. For each observation, the
data contains the editor’s username, the corresponding month, the size and number
of edits contributed during that month both as aggregate and breaking down into
additions and deletions.
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for our dataset. Among the 9,133
editors in our sample, there are 6,215 who join a WikiProject with a total of 576,132
editor-month observations. The main outcome variables that we use in the analysis
include the number and size of edits, additions and deletions. The size of edits is
measured by the number of characters modified by the editor. For each measure,
Table 4.1 gives the average value both for entire sample and for the treated and
non-treated editors separately. The 9,183 editors contribute a average of 116 edits
in every month, which amounts to 44,114 characters. The treated editors who join
a WikiProject contribute on average 114 edits and 44,345 characters in each month.
Prior to joining a WikiProject, the treated editors contribute to 64 edits and 22,300
characters. After that, they contribute to 139 edits and 55,172 characters on average.
That is, after joining a WikiProject, the average contribution level measured by the
number and size of edits more than doubles.
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4.5 Results
In this section, we present our results investigating the impact of WikiProject
on users’ contribution behavior. We first explore how joining a WikiProject affect
one’s contribution measured by the number and size of revisions. Then, we explore
the mechanism underlying its impact.
4.5.1 Proof of Treatment
As introduced in Section 3, WikiProject induces a common identity among users
who share similar interests. How does such a common identity affect individual
contribution behavior? The group-contingent social preference framework (Basu,
2006; Chen and Li, 2009; Mcleish and J.Oxoby, n.d.) models a potential contribu-
tor as maximizing a weighted sum of her own and others payoff, and predicts that
those who share the same group identity tend to behave more pro-socially. Evi-
dence from both laboratory (Chen and Chen, 2011; Eckel and Grossman, 2005) and
field experiments (Ai et al., 2016; Erev et al., 1993) provide supports to this pre-
diction. Therefore, we expect users who join a WikiProject increase their level of
contribution.
Hypothesis 1. Compared to those who are not a WikiProject member, joining a
WikiProject increases one’s level of contribution.
Before reporting the regression results, we first provide a graphical illustration
on the editors’ contribution behavior before and after joining a WikiProject. In
Figure 4.3, we recenter the month in which the editors join a WikiProject to zero
and plots the average number and size of edits, additions and deletions in six months
before and after. The solid lines represent the average value in each month, with the
error bars denoting one standard error.
We first note in the figure that prior to the treated editors joining a WikiProject,
there is an increase in the number of edits. For example, the average contribu-
tion level starts from 132 edits and 44,675 characters in six month before joining
a WikiProject, and reaches 240 edits with 106,694 characters in one month before.
Both the average number and size of edits reach their peaks in the month when
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Figure 4.3: Contribution level before and after WikiProject membership
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the editors join the WikiProject. While the contribution level decreases gradually
afterwards, it remains higher than it is before the editor join the WikiProject for
at least five months. The plots for additions and deletions show a similar pattern
that editors become increasingly active and decline in their contribution level after
joining a WikiProject. These observations indicate the possibility that there may be
pre-existing trends in the behavior of the treated editors before they join a WikiPro-
ject. More importantly, given the gradual increase in the contribution level prior
to WikiProject membership, the decisions to join a WikiProject might be driven by
editors’ unobserved characteristics. Therefore, a direct before-after comparison of
the treated editors’ behavior may suffer from a self-selection bias - the editors who
join a WikiProject are intrinsically more active than those who do not.
The visual evidence presented in Figure 4.3 shows that the treated editors who
join a WikiProject make remarkably more contributions than before. However, it
does not rule out the possibility that some unobservable factors drives the differ-
ence. To identify and estimate the causal effect of WikiProject membership, we
adopt an instrumental variable approach that exploits exogenous variations corre-
lated with joining a WikiProject. We start with the following regression framework:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 ×Membershipi,t + εi,t,
where i indexes the editors and t indexes months. The dependent variable, Yi,t,
is the quantity measure of an editor’s contribution in month t. Membershipi,t is a
dummy variable representing the membership status of editor i.
Our instrumental variable approach is inspired by how the editors are exposed
to WikiProjects. For each Wikipedia article, the WikiProjects to which it belong
are listed on its talk page (see Figure 4.4 for the example of the article “Public
Good”). Depending on how much the editors visit articles’ talk pages, the lists
of the associated WikiProjects give the editors various levels of exposure to the
WikiProjects. The lists of associated Wikirojects are maintained in a decentralized
manner by individual editors. To categorize an article under a WikiProject, any
registered editor can add the Wiki link of that WikiProject to the talk page of the
article. To remove an article from a WikiProject, any registered editor can delete
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Figure 4.4: Screenshot for the Talk Page of Article “Public Good”
the Wiki link of the WikiProject from the talk page of the article.
The decentralized maintenance of the list of associated WikiProjects introduces
a natural source of variation in the editors’ exposure to WikiProjects, which will ar-
guably affects whether one joins a WikiProject. Consider a simple example where
an article “public goods” is categorized to WikiProject Economics on time t. Edi-
tors who visit it talk page before time t will not see the Wiki link of the project and
therefore be less exposed to the project, while those who visit after time t will.
To construct our instrumental variable, we define the intensity of exposure to
WikiProject as below. For each editor i in month t, we focus on the set of articles
whose talk pages are revised by her in that month. Among these articles, let T ∗i,t
denote the ones that are assigned a WikiProject by month t and Ti,t denote the ones
that are eventually associated with a WikiProject by the October of 2016. For exam-
ple, consider an editor i who revises the talk page of four articles - “public goods”,
“public economics”, “microeconomics” and “Wikipedia” in month t. Suppose that
“public goods”, “public economics” and “microeconomics” would all belong to
WikiProject Economics, but the first two are associated with the project in month
t1 < t and the third one is associated in month t2 > t. The article “Wikipedia”
does not belong to any WikiProject. For editor i, Ti,t contains the three articles that
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eventually belong to WikiProject Economics “public goods”, “public economics”,
“microeconomics” but T ∗i,t contains only the first two articles that have been associ-
ated by month t. The measure for WikiProject exposure is calculated by taking the
ratio of the number of articles contained in these two sets, |T ∗i,t|/|Ti,t|.
Our choice of instrument is valid if it affects contribution behavior only through
its impact on one’s decision to join a WikiProject. When an editor revises an arti-
cle’s talk page, whether an associated WikiProject is listed is determined by the ed-
itors who edited it previously. Hence, whether that article belongs to a WikiProject
at the time is exogenous to that editor. One may be concerned that the instrument
merely captures how active an editor is. However, we normalize the measure of
exposure to WikiProject by |Ti,t| so that the variation in the instrument is driven by
the level of exposure to WikiProject relative to one’s activeness. Another poten-
tial source of endogeneity is that editors who are extremely interested in specific
topics are more likely to edit talk pages of articles that belong to relevant WikiPro-
jects. In that case, the instrument would reflect the editors’ interests. However, we
only focus on articles that would eventually belong to a WikiProjects rather than all
articles.
We present the estimation for the treatment effect in Table 4.2. We use num-
ber and size (count of characters) of revisions and additions as measures for one’s
contribution. For each measure, we report both the estimation results using simple
OLS regressions and the two-stage least square IV regressions. Editor-level and
month-level fixed effects are also controlled. We also include the first-stage results
for the IV regressions. There exists a strong and positive correlation between the
constructed measure of exposure to WikiProject and whether one joins a WikiPro-
ject. The associated F statistics for the first stage is 137.85, indicating that our
estimation results do not suffer from the bias due to weak instrument.
The regression results in Table 4.2 indicate that joining a WikiProject yields eco-
nomically and statistically significant impact on individual contributions. Column
2 shows that WikiProject membership leads to an average increase of 79 revisions
per month (p-values < 0.01). Compared with the average level of 64 revisions per
month before the treatment, joining a WikiProject more than doubles an editor’s
contribution. Similar evidence is obtained for the size of revisions measured by
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the number of characters: joining a WikiProject yields 8,672 more characters per
month, which is 1.5 times more than the level before.
Columns 6 and 8 present the estimate for the impact of WikiProject membership
on the additions. After joining a WikiProject, the treatment leads to 39 additions and
6,199 characters per month (p-values < 0.01). Combining with the results obtained
in columns 2 and 4, we find an interesting pattern that additions account for less
than 50% of the average effect when measured by the number of revisions and
more than 60% when measured by the size. One explanation for the discrepancy is
that addition differs from other types of revisions (such as deletion and uploading
files) in that addition is usually involved with more effort.
Result 1. Compared to those who are not a WikiProject member, joining a WikiPro-
ject leads to a significantly increase in one’s contribution level by
1. 79 more number of revisions or 8,672 more characters per month,
2. 39 more number of additions or 6,199 more characters per month.
We also provide in Table 4.2 the estimation results obtained from the ordinary
least square regressions. The OLS estimates for the impact from joining a WikiPro-
ject are consistently higher than the IV estimates. For example, this indicates that
the results from simple OLS regression might overestimate the impact of WikiPro-
ject membership.
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4.5.2 Mechanism for WikiProject Membership
One potential mechanism underlying the impact of WikiProject is the reduc-
tion in search cost. WikiProjects provide editors with relevant articles to improve
through various ways, such as open tasks and collaborations of the week or month
(Zhu et al., 2012). These recommendations lowers the cost of identifying the arti-
cles one is interested in and make editors’ contribution more centralized (Kittur and
Kraut, 2008; Kittur et al., 2009; Morgan et al., 2013; Ransbotham and Kane, 2011).
To examine whether our result can be explained by this mechanism, the most
straightforward way is to explore how the change in editors’ behavior relates to the
number of recommendations provided by the WikiProjects. However, the WikiPro-
jects vary in the manner in which the recommendations are presented and it is dif-
ficult to measure the number of recommendations uniformly. We overcome this
problem by using the character size of WikiProject home page as a proxy for the
number of recommendations provided. The rationale behind this measure is that
various devices that provide recommendation are usually presented at the home
page of a WikiProject. For example, in the template for WikiProject home page,
there are pre-defined sections that aim to provide recommendations such as open
tasks, new articles to be created and assessment. Thus, we can use the size of
WikiProject home page as an alternative measure for the variation in the number
of recommendations. If coordination through article recommendation drives the in-
crease in editors’ contribution, we would expect that WikiProjects of larger sizes
(and hence more recommendations) encourages more contribution. This gives the
following hypothesis regarding the size of WikiProject home page and increase in
contribution behavior.
Hypothesis 2. The users who join a WikiProject with a home page of larger size
increase their level of contribution more than those who join a WikiProject with a
home page of smaller size do.
Figure 4.5 provides a visual presentation on the association between size of
WikiProject and change in editors’ contribution, measured by the number and size
of revisions and additions. Each point in the figures corresponds an editor who is
a member of a WikiProject and the dotted line is a simple OLS fit. The vertical
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axis represents the increase in the contribution level in the month in which she joins
relative to the month immediately before. The horizontal axis represents the size of
WikiProject. To mitigate the impact from outliers, we apply log transformations to
both measures.
Figure 4.5: Change in Editors’ Contribution and Size of WikiProjects
The slopes of the fitted line are significantly larger than 0 for all the four mea-
sures. That is, there is a positive relationship between the size of a WikiProject
and the change in the level of contributions by editors’ who becomes a member.
Given this, we can further investigate the quantitative relationship by estimating the
following equation:
log (yi) = α0 + α1 × log (Project sizei) + α2 × log (Lyi) + εi,
where yi is the measure of an editor i’s contribution in the month in which she be-
comes a WikiProject member and Project Sizei is the character size of the WikiPro-
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ject in which an editor joins. logLyi is the one-month period lagged term and
controls for an editor’s contribution level prior to WikiProject membership.
If the hypothesized mechanism explains the treatment, We expect that the edi-
tors who join a project of larger size makes more contributions to articles related to
it. Table 4.3 reports the results from the above regression. In the alternative spec-
ifications, we also include the square term of log (Project size) to control for the
potential U-shape pattern of the project size. It turns out that the goodness-of-fit is
not improved as the adjusted R2 is lower. Using the likelihood ratio test, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that including the squared term of log (Project size) gives
a better fit for the data. Furthermore, the regression results show that the depen-
dent variables are increasing in log (Project size) within the range of values in our
dataset. We relegate the results from this alternative specification to Table D.7 in
Appendix Appendix D.
We see that the variations in the size of WikiProject have a significantly positive
impacts on the level of contribution. The estimated coefficients for log (Project size)
are significantly positive for both the number and size of revisions (column 1 and
2) and additions (column 3 and 4). Based on a simple back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation, a one standard deviation increase in log (Project size) yields more than a 8%
increase in the number of revisions and nearly 14% increase in the size of revisions.
Repeating the analysis for contribution level measured by additions gives estimates
that are similar in both magnitude and significance level. The results suggest that a
WikiProject with more information on its homepage tend to induce higher increases
in the contributions from its membership, indicating that article recommendation
could be the mechanism underlying the impact of WikiProjects.
Result 2. The increase in a user’s level of contribution to the articles under the
joined project is significantly larger if the home page of the project is larger. Specif-
ically, a one standard deviation increase in log(Project size) leads to
1. 8.157% increase in the number of revisions or 13.821% increase in number
of characters,
2. 7.437% increase in the number of additions or 15.299% increase in number
of characters added.
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Table 4.3: Project Size and Contribution to the Articles under the Joined Project
Dep. var.: Revision Addition
Measure: Number Size Number Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (Project size) 0.043∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.024)
Lagged dep. var. 0.554∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
∆% of dep. var. in response to
unit s.d. change in log (Project size) 8.157∗∗∗ 13.821∗∗∗ 7.437∗∗∗ 15.299∗∗∗
(2.292) (4.865) (2.290) (5.279)
p-values for LR Test 0.830 0.913 0.735 0.848
R2 0.393 0.281 0.382 0.282
Observations 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500
Notes. The dependent variable is a user’s contribution after joining a WikiProject. Stan-
dard errors are provided in parentheses. *** denotes significance level at 1% level.
Previous works exploring the effect of social identity on pro-social behavior
provide evidence that when individuals tend to exhibit less other-regarding behavior
to groups that they identify less with (Bernhard et al., 2006; Chen and Li, 2009;
Goette et al., 2006). Given the large influence of the number of recommendations
provided by a project on an editor’s behavior, it is interesting to explore whether
there is any spillover to articles that do not belong to the project. To the extent
that WikiProjects constitute a social group, we expect that the change in members’
contribution behavior to articles under other WikiProjects are not affected through
this channel. This gives the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The size of the home page of the WikiProject which a user join does
not affect her contribution to articles that do not belong to the joined WikiProject.
Using the same specifications in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 report the link between
project size and change in contributions to articles outside the project that an editor
join. Unlike the impacts on articles under the joined project, the estimates for those
outside are closer to zero and statistically insignificant. This is consistent with our
proposed mechanism of recommendation: the articles that are not associated with
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the project that one joins are less likely to be listed on the home page, and therefore
the size of the project has smaller impact on editors’ contribution on them.
Result 3. The increase in a user’s level of contribution to the articles that do not
belong to the joined project is not significantly affected by the size of the home page
for the project.
To further test our proposed mechanism, we extend the analysis by estimating
the following equation:
log (yi,k) = α0 + α1 × Jaccard similarityi,k + α2 × log (Lyi,k) + εi,k.
Here, yi,k is editor i’s contribution to a project k after joining a WikiProject. Jaccard
similarityi,k is a continuous measure for how similar the project k is to the project
that editor i joins. Jaccard similarity is an widely used in the area of information
retrieval to quantify how close or similar two sets are (Leskovec et al., 2014). For-
mally, Jaccard similarity between two finite sets is calculated by the size of their
intersection divided by the size of their union. For example, a Jaccard similarity of
1 implies two identical sets, where as a Jaccard similarity of 0 implies two disjoint
sets. In our context, we follow Platt and Romero (2018) and define the Jaccard sim-
ilarity between two WikiProjects as the number of articles associated with both of
the two projects and the number of articles associated with either one. The results
in Table 4.5 further supports the proposed mechanism. The parameter estimates for
Jaccard similarity are significantly positive in columns 1 through 4. The estimates
show that a one percentile increase in the Jaccard similarity is associated with a
0.64% increase in the number of revisions and a 2.06% increase in the size. Taken
together, the above results provide evidence indicating that the recommendations of
articles can explain the influence of WikiProject membership.
It is noteworthy that although the results presented in Table 4.3 give support
to the effect of article recommendation, it does not rule out the possibility that
WikiProjects encourage more user contribution through other channels. For exam-
ple, users can be more intrinsically motivated by the common identity that they
share with the WikiProjects that they join (Solomon and Wash, 2014). In that
sense, WikiProjects with a stronger group identity (e.g., with a project user-box)
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Table 4.4: Project Size and Contributions to Articles outside the Joined Project
Dep. var.: Revision Additions
Measure: Number Size Number Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (Project size) 0.005 -0.014 0.006 -0.021
(0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014)
Lagged dep. var. 0.537∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
∆% of dep. var. in response to
unit s.d. change in log (Project size) 1.126 -2.706 1.223 -3.886
(1.634) (2.476) (1.622) (2.505)
R2 0.431 0.306 0.414 0.285
Observations 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500
Notes. The dependent variable is a user’s contribution after joining a WikiProject.
Standard errors are provided in parentheses. *** denote significance level at 1% level.
Table 4.5: Jaccard Similarity and Contribution Level
Dep. var.: Revision Additions
Measure: Number Size Number Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jaccard similarity 0.638∗∗∗ 2.038∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.031) (0.010) (0.032)
Lagged dep. var. 0.312∗∗∗ -0.015 0.417∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.050) (0.007) (0.008)
∆% of dep. var. in response to
percentile change in Jaccard Similarity 0.640∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 1.882∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.031) (0.010) (0.033)
R2 0.130 0.030 0.172 0.040
Observations 636,340 636,340 636,340 636,340
Notes. The dependent variable is a user’s contribution after joining a WikiProject. Stan-
dard errors are provided in parentheses. *** denote significance level at 1% level.
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might drive their members to contribute more than those without one. We expect to
more future work will be dedicated to fully disentangle the mechanisms of article
recommendation versus project identity.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present field evidence on the causal effects of group mem-
bership on encouraging individual contribution to public information goods. We
analyze how joining WikiProjects - a collaboration platform designed to motivate
and coordinate user effort - can lead to more edits to Wikipedia articles from in-
dividual users. Using an instrumental variable approach that exploits variations in
the intensity of exposure to WikiProjects, we find that joining a WikiProject results
in a substantial increase in user contribution, namely 79 more revisions and 34,686
more characters per month. Compared with the user behavior prior to WikiProject
membership, the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect amounts to more than
1.5 times than the contribution level before.
To understand the underlying mechanism behind the influence of WikiProject,
we examine how the characteristics of WikiProjects relate to the increase in user
contribution. Using the size of project homepage as a proxy measure for the num-
ber of recommendation devices, our analysis shows that a project with more rec-
ommendations yields significantly larger change in the level of user contribution.
Specifically, the Wikipedia users who join a large This indicates that coordination
through article recommendation could be the potential mechanism that fosters user
engagement.
The findings in this paper contribute to the research on motivating pro-social
behavior with identity-based approach in various field settings. While previous
studies have confirmed the potential of group identity to induce pro-social behavior
through coordination and competition, the evidence in this paper suggests the group
membership can encourage contribution to public information goods through the
provision of recommendations to users.
Lastly, our analysis provide design implications on Wikipedia and many other
online platforms that rely on voluntary contribution from individual users. While
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much effort has been dedicated to encouraging user engagement enhancing mem-
bers’ identity, our results suggest that recommending tasks efficiently through group
coordination can be important considerations.
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Appendix A Proofs
In this appendix, we will present the proofs for the two propositions in section
3.3. We use backward induction to solve the second stage optimization problem
first.
Proof of Proposition 2: After seeing the realization of the matching accuracy, mi,
expert i solves the following optimization problem:
max
yi∈[0,T ]
v(n)
(
y0 + yi +
∑
y−i
)
+ w(n, si)yi + ri(T − yi)− c(yi)
mi
. (1)
For agents whose marginal contribution cost at zero is flat relative to the net
marginal benefit and opportunity cost adjusted by match quality, i.e., c′(0) < (v(n)+
w(n, si) − ri) · mi, the unique interior solution is characterized by the following
first-order condition:
c′(y) =
(
v(n) + w(n, si)− ri
) ·mi.
Let k(·) ≡ (c′)−1(·), which is the inverse of the marginal cost function. The
interior solution is characterized by
yi = k
(
(v(n) + w(n, si)− ri) ·mi
)
. (2)
For agents whose marginal contribution cost at zero is sufficiently steep relative
to the net marginals adjusted by match quality, i.e., c′(0) ≥ (v(n) +w(n, si)− ri) ·
mi, the optimal contribution level is a corner solution, yi = 0. Taken together, the
optimal contribution level in the second stage is
y∗ = max
{
0, k
(
(v(n) + w(n, si)− ri) ·mi
)}
(3)
For the interior solution, it is straightforward to obtain the following comparative
statics, which serve as the benchmark for our experimental design and data analysis.
(a) An increase in the number of consumers of the public information good leads
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to an increased level of contribution, i.e.,
∂y∗
∂n
= k′ · (v′(n) + wn(n, si)) ·mi > 0.
(b) An increase in the private benefit of contributions leads to an increased level
of contributions, i.e.,
∂y∗
∂w
= k′ ·mi > 0.
(c) An expert with a higher reputation will contribute less, i.e.,
∂y∗
∂r
= −k′ ·mi < 0.
(d) Better matching between the content of the public information good and the
agent’s expertise leads to an increased level of contributions, i.e.,
∂y∗
∂mi
= k′ · (v(n) + w(n, si)− ri).
If the interior solution exists, we have v(n) + w(n, si)− ri ≥ 0. Hence,
∂y∗
∂mi
≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: We now offer the proof for proposition 1. In the first stage,
an expert does not see the realization of the match accuracy, mi, but knows its
distribution f(m). Therefore, she forms her expectations for the matching accuracy
mi. Given a matching accuracy mi, the optimal contribution level in the second
stage is y∗(mi). If the expert chooses to participate, her expected utility is given by∫ 1
0
(
v(n)
(
y∗ +
∑
y−i
)
+ w(n, si)y
∗ + ri(T − y∗)− c(y
∗)
m
)
f(m)dm.
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If the expert chooses not to participate, her expected utility is
v(n) ·
∑
y−i + riT.
Therefore, one chooses to participate if
G(n,w, si, ri) =
∫ 1
0
(
v(n)y∗ + w(n, si)y∗ − riy∗ − c(y
∗)
m
)
f(m)dm ≥ 0. (4)
It now suffices to show that G(n,w, si, ri) is increasing in n and w, and decreasing
si and ri.
Let m(n,w, si, ri) be implicitly defined by y∗(n,w, si, ri,m) = 0. That is,
m is the minimum matching accuracy required to make an expert contribute. By
definition, we have
y∗ =
{
k
(
(v(n) + w(n, si)− ri) ·m
)
, if m > m
0, if m ≤ m
This implies that
G(n,w, si, ri) =
∫ 1
m(n)
(
v(n)y∗ + w(n, si)y∗ − riy∗ − c(y
∗)
m
)
f(m)dm.
Hence,
∂G
∂n
=
∂
∂n
∫ 1
m
(
v(n)y∗ + w(n, si)y∗ − riy∗ − c(y
∗)
m
)
f(m)dm
= m′(n) ·
(
v(n)y∗(n,m) + w(n, si)y∗(n,m)− riy∗(n,m)− c(y
∗(n,m)
m
)
f(m)
+
∫ 1
m
∂
∂n
(
v(n)y∗(n,m) + w(n, si)y∗(n,m)− riy∗(n,m)− c(y
∗(n,m))
m
)
f(m)dm
=
∫ 1
m
∂
∂n
(
v(n)y∗(n,m) + w(n, si)y∗(n,m)− riy∗(n,m)− c(y
∗(n,m))
m
)
f(m)dm
When m > m, an interior solution exists for optimization problem 1. Applying the
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envelope theorem yields
∂
∂n
(
v(n)y∗ + w(n, si)y∗ − riy∗ − c(y
∗)
m
)
= (vn + wn)y
∗ ≥ 0,
which indicates that ∂G/∂n ≥ 0, i.e., a potential contributor is more likely to
participate if the number of consumers increases.
Similarly, we have
∂G
∂w
=
∫ 1
m
y∗(n,w, si, ri)f(m)dm ≥ 0.
∂G
∂si
=
∫ 1
m
wsy
∗(n,w, si, ri)f(m)dm ≤ 0.
∂G
∂ri
= −
∫ 1
m
y∗(n,w, si, ri)f(m)dm ≤ 0.
Therefore, a potential contributor is more likely to participate if the private benefit
increases, or if her expertise overlaps with the askers, or her opportunity cost of
time is lower. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B Recommendation algorithm
We first describe the method we use to identify experts’ domain of expertise.
We develop a filtering algorithm which is based on the experts’ recent research
papers archived at New Economics Papers (NEP). NEP is an announcement service
aiming to provide up-to-date information about research literature. It disseminates
and archives new research papers in 97 research areas.1 For each expert, we refer
to NEP her recent research works as well as the research fields where each work
is classified. Then, we select the research field in which her research works are
classified most and use that one as the most recent domain of expertise. The pseudo-
code for the filtering algorithm used to identify the most recent domain of expertise
is presented below.
foreach Expert
ResearchList← Expert’s research works at NEP
foreach Work in ResearchList
ResearchFields← research fields of Work at NEP
foreach Field in ResearchFields
NumFields[Field]← NumFields[Field] + 1
DomainExpertise← max(NumFields)
In what follows, we present details about our selection criteria for Wikipedia
articles. For each of an expert’s research papers listed at NEP, the recommen-
dation algorithm submits a search query containing the keywords in the paper
through Google Custom Engine API. The search result returned from Google con-
tains Wikipedia articles that are potentially relevant enough for recommendation.
After we iterate over all research papers by an experts, we reach a list of Wikipedia
articles indicated as relevant to the experts’ recent research focus. We further re-
strict this list using the following criteria: 1) The article must be under the names-
pace 0 (i.e., main articles);2 2) The article is not edit protected;3 3) The character
1See http://nep.repec.org/.
2Wikipedia uses namespace to categorize webpages according to their functions. All ency-
clopedia articles at Wikipedia are under namespace 0. Webpages under other namespaces in-
clude talk pages and user pages. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Namespace for a detailed explanation of namespace at Wikipedia.
3Edit protection restriction a Wikipedia article from being edited by users. It is usually applied to
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length of article is not less than 1,500 characters; 4) The article is viewed at least
1,000 times in the past 30 days (dynamically updated) prior to exposure to the inter-
vention.4 Finally, we choose the six Wikipedia articles that appear most frequently
in the search results by Google Custom Engine for our recommendation.
foreach Expert
foreach Work in ResearchList
WPArticles← Results from Google searching keyword in Work
foreach Article in WPArticles
CountWP[Article]← CountWP[Article] + 1
foreach Article in CountWP
if Article is not namespace 0 or
Article is edit protected or
Article has fewer than 1,500 characters or
Article is viewed for fewer than 1,000 times over the past 30 days
remove Article from CountWP
DomainExpertise← max(CountFields)
articles that is subject to content disputes or the risk of vandalism. The decision to apply or remove
edit protection is made by administrators at Wikipedia. See https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia:Protection_policy for a detailed explanation of the edit protection pol-
icy at Wikipedia.
4This restriction guarantees that articles recommended in the AvgView condition are balanced
regarding the number of views versus those recommended in the HighView condition. The experi-
mental manipulation is merely the mentioning of number of views, but not any inherent difference
in viewship.
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Appendix C Screen shots
In this section, we provide screen shots of interface design for our field experi-
ments. Figure C.1 presents our webpage where experts enter their comments. The
interface is designed to minimize entry cost. An expert does not need to know
how to edit a wiki. In the split screen design, the right side is the corresponding
Wikipedia article that the expert can scroll up or down. The left side has a quality
rating and a text box for the expert to enter comments. As long as she can use Word,
she will be able to enter comments.
Figure C.1: Webpage of Comment
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Figure C.2 presents our public acknowledgement of expert contributions to
Wikipedia articles. This page was assembled by a Wikipedia editor who was a
doctoral student in Economics at the University of Lancaster. The economists on
this list contributed to our project during its pilot phase.
Figure C.2: Public Acknowledgement Hosted on a WikiProject Economics Page
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Figure C.3: First-stage Email
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Figure C.4: Second-stage Email
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Appendix D Robustness checks
Table D.1: Average Marginal Effect on the First-stage Response.
Dependent Variable: Positive Null Negative Positive Null Negative
P(R = 1) P(R = 0) P(R = −1) P(R = 1) P(R = 0) P(R = −1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighView 0.002 0.021 -0.022 0.004 0.018 -0.022
(0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027)
Cite 0.042 0.022 -0.064** 0.037 0.030 -0.067**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
CiteAckn 0.030 0.020 -0.050* 0.020 0.024 -0.044*
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027)
HighView × Cite 0.021 -0.023 0.002 0.023 -0.028 0.005
(0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037)
HighView × CiteAckn 0.017 -0.003 -0.013 0.021 -0.005 -0.016
(0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
Percentile of Abstract Views 0.029 -0.039*** 0.030***
(0.030) (0.008) (0.008)
English Affiliation -0.020 -0.037** 0.057***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Overlap 0.212*** -0.079*** -0.133***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025)
HighView + HighView × Cite 0.022 -0.002 -0.020 0.027 -0.010 -0.017
(0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025)
Cite + HighView × Cite 0.063** -0.001 -0.062** 0.060** 0.002 -0.062**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.018 0.017 -0.036 0.025 0.013 -0.038
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 0.047 0.016 -0.063** 0.041 0.019 -0.060**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Model Specification Multinomial Logistic Multinomial Logistic
Observations 3,346 3,301
Notes. The dependent variable is the expert’s response to the email in the first stage. Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
Average marginal effects are calculated using the Delta method. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table D.2: Determinants of Contribution Quantity
Dependent Variable: log(1 + Word Count)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HighView -0.034 0.066 -0.051 0.030
(0.100) (0.214) (0.101) (0.216)
Cite -0.070 -0.086 -0.086 -0.119
(0.096) (0.210) (0.097) (0.213)
CiteAckn -0.069 -0.047 -0.085 -0.086
(0.096) (0.209) (0.098) (0.213)
HighView × Cite -0.072 -0.202 -0.058 -0.176
(0.137) (0.299) (0.138) (0.302)
HighView × CiteAckn 0.131 0.147 0.147 0.175
(0.138) (0.295) (0.139) (0.299)
Cosine Similarity 1.768*** 2.861***
(0.166) (0.360)
Percentile of Article Length -0.116* -0.166
(0.080) (0.186)
Percentile of Abstract View 0.154* 0.213
(0.099) (0.217)
English Affiliation 0.097** 0.155
(0.057) 0.123
Overlap 0.373*** 0.741***
(0.099) (0.194)
HighView + HighView × Cite -0.105 -0.137 -0.108 -0.145
(0.093) (0.208) (0.094) (0.211)
Cite + HighView × Cite -0.142 -0.289 -0.144 -0.295*
(0.097) (0.212) (0.098) (0.215)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.098 0.213 0.097 0.205
(0.095) (0.203) (0.096) (0.207)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 0.062 0.100 0.063 0.089
(0.098) (0.207) (0.099) (0.209)
Model Specification OLS Exp. Disp. OLS Exp. Disp.
Observations 8,819 8,819 8,635 8,635
Notes. The dependent variable is the log transformation of word count. Columns (1) and
(3) report the results from the OLS model, and columns (2) and (4) reports the results from
the exponential dispersion model. Quality class and importance class are controlled in all
specifications. Fixed effects are controlled at the expert level. Standard errors are reported
in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table D.3: Determinants of Contribution Quality
Dependent Variable: Overall Quality Helpfulness # of Sub-comments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighView 0.870 0.901 0.846 0.870 0.885* 0.898*
(0.161) (0.169) (0.157) (0.164) (0.056) (0.058)
Cite 0.877 0.869 0.815 0.806 0.900* 0.893*
(0.157) (0.158) (0.147) (0.147) (0.056) (0.056)
CiteAckn 1.498** 1.575** 1.346 1.447** 1.094 1.125*
(0.273) (0.295) (0.246) (0.271) (0.066) (0.069)
HighView × Cite 1.403 1.428 1.642* 1.703** 1.122 1.141
(0.375) (0.386) (0.439) (0.461) (0.105) (0.107)
HighView × CiteAckn 1.058 1.008 1.239 1.139 1.045 1.003
(0.275) (0.268) (0.322) (0.302) (0.092) (0.089)
Cosine Similarity 12.221*** 15.085*** 3.422***
(7.302) (9.056) (0.635)
Percentile of Article Length 1.078 1.168 1.232**
(0.326) (0.354) (0.125)
Percentile of Abstract View 0.930 1.105 1.049
(0.184) (0.220) (0.070)
English Affiliation 1.018 1.130 0.998
(0.112) (0.125) (0.037)
Overlap 1.387* 1.451** 1.112*
(0.238) (0.246) (0.063)
HighView + HighView × Cite 1.220 1.286 1.388* 1.481** 0.993 1.025
(0.235) (0.253) (0.267) (0.291) (0.068) (0.071)
Cite + HighView × Cite 1.230 1.241 1.337 1.372 1.011 1.019
(0.243) (0.248) (0.264) (0.275) (0.070) (0.071)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.920 0.908 1.048 0.991 0.924 0.901*
(0.168) (0.172) (0.191) (0.186) (0.056) (0.055)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 1.584** 1.588** 1.668*** 1.648*** 1.143** 1.129**
(0.295) (0.301) (0.310) (0.311) (0.072) (0.072)
Model Specification Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Poisson
Observations 1,097 1,078 1,097 1,078 1,097 1,078
Notes. Columns (1)-(4) report odds ratio estimated from ordered logistic regressions. Column (5) and (6) report incidence-
rate ratio estimated from Poisson regressions. Quality class and importance class are controlled in all specifications. Stan-
dard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table D.4: Average Marginal Effect on Overall Quality
Dependent Variable: Overall Quality
P(Y = 1) P(Y = 2) P(Y = 3) P(Y = 4) P(Y = 5) P(Y = 6) P(Y = 7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HighView 0.007 0.010 0.008 -0.000 -0.014 -0.007 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.001) (0.025) (0.012) (0.005)
Cite 0.010 0.015 0.011 -0.001 -0.019 -0.009 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.025) (0.011) (0.005)
CiteAckn -0.024** -0.022* -0.038** -0.013* 0.057** 0.034** 0.015**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.007) (0.024) (0.015) (0.007)
HighView × Cite -0.024* -0.036* -0.029 0.000 0.048 0.023 0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.003) (0.037) (0.017) (0.007)
HighView × CiteAckn -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.009) (0.034) (0.020) (0.009)
Cosine Similarity -0.149*** -0.169*** -0.203*** -0.037** 0.322*** 0.174*** 0.078***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.018) (0.076) (0.044) (0.023)
log(Article Length) -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.008 0.004 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003)
log(Abstract View) 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
English Affiliation -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.008) (0.003)
Overlap -0.019* -0.023** -0.026* -0.005 0.042* 0.023* 0.010*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.003) (0.022) (0.012) (0.006)
HighView + HighView × Cite -0.017 -0.026** -0.020 -0.000 0.034 0.016 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.003) (0.027) (0.013) (0.006)
Cite + HighView × Cite -0.014 -0.021 -0.018 -0.001 0.029 0.014 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.003) (0.027) (0.013) (0.006)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.022) (0.016) (0.008)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn -0.027** -0.031** -0.039** -0.008 0.061** 0.033** 0.015**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.006) (0.025) (0.014) (0.006)
Model Specification Ordered Logistic
Observations 1078
Notes. Columns (1)-(7) report the average marginal effects on the probability that median overall quality receives the corresponding score.
Quality class and importance class are controlled in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table D.5: Average Marginal Effect on Helpfulness
Dependent Variable: Helpfulness
P(Y = 1) P(Y = 2) P(Y = 3) P(Y = 4) P(Y = 5) P(Y = 6) P(Y = 7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HighView 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.003 -0.017 -0.011 -0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007)
Cite 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.004 -0.026 -0.017 -0.007
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.022) (0.014) (0.006)
CiteAckn -0.021* -0.022* -0.027* -0.017* 0.038* 0.033* 0.016*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) (0.009)
HighView × Cite -0.038* -0.036* -0.040* -0.013 0.063* 0.043* 0.019*
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.008) (0.032) (0.022) (0.010)
HighView × CiteAckn -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.003 0.017 0.011 0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) (0.029) (0.024) (0.012)
Cosine Similarity -0.175*** -0.169*** -0.200*** -0.098*** 0.295*** 0.235*** 0.111***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.026) (0.066) (0.054) (0.029)
log(Article Length) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006** -0.003 0.009 0.007 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004)
log(Abstract View) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
English Affiliation -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 0.014 0.011 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005)
Overlap -0.024** -0.023** -0.027** -0.013** 0.040** 0.032** 0.015**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.019) (0.015) (0.007)
HighView + HighView × Cite -0.027* -0.026** -0.029** -0.010 0.046** 0.032* 0.014*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.023) (0.017) (0.008)
Cite + HighView × Cite -0.022 -0.021 -0.024 -0.010 0.037 0.027 0.012
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.023) (0.017) (0.008)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn -0.032** -0.031** -0.038*** -0.020** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.021**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.021) (0.017) (0.008)
Model Specification Ordered Logistic
Observations 1078
Notes. Columns (1)-(7) report the average marginal effects on the probability that median helpfulness receives the corresponding score.
Quality class and importance class are controlled in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table D.6: Average Marginal Effect on # of Sub-comments
Dependent Variable: # of Sub-comments
HighView -0.288*
(0.170)
Cite -0.297*
(0.167)
CiteAckn 0.335*
(0.183)
HighView × Cite 0.343
(0.243)
HighView × CiteAckn -0.010
(0.251)
Cosine Similarity 3.364***
(0.512)
log(Article Length) 0.195**
(0.0095)
log(Abstract View) -0.002
(0.058)
English Affiliation -0.002
(0.102)
Overlap 0.279*
(0.154)
HighView + HighView × Cite 0.056
(0.175)
Cite + HighView × Cite 0.046
(0.177)
HighView + HighView × CiteAckn -0.298
(0.185)
CiteAckn + HighView × CiteAckn 0.324*
(0.171)
Model Specification Poisson
Observations 1078
Notes. Columns (1)-(7) report the average marginal effects on the number of subcomments receives the correspond-
ing score. Quality class and importance class are controlled in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in the
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table D.7: Project Size and Contribution to the Articles under
the Joined Project
Dep. var.: Revision Addition
Measure: Number Size Number Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (Project size) 0.050 0.083 0.044 0.087
(0.011) (0.059) (0.034) (0.062)
log (Project size)2 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Lagged dep. var. 0.554∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
R2 0.393 0.281 0.382 0.282
Observations 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500
Notes. The dependent variable is a user’s contribution after joining
a WikiProject. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. ***
denotes significance level at 1% level.
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Appendix E Rating Protocol
Below we provide the rating protocol. For each of the rating question, we also
provide the mean, median and standard error.
Welcome to this rating session. Before you rate each comment, please read the
associated Wikipedia article first.
• Suppose that you are to incorporate the expert’s review of this Wikipedia arti-
cle and you want to break down the review into multiple pieces of comments.
How many pieces of comments has the expert made to this Wikipedia article?
(mean: 2.711, median: 2, standard error: 0.069)
• According to the expert, this Wikipedia article has
errors (mean: 1.444, median: 0, standard error: 0.912)
missing points (mean: 1.098, median: 1, standard error: 0.040)
missing references (mean: 0.626, median: 0, standard error: 0.049)
outdated information (mean: 0.043, median: 0, standard error:
0.007)
outdated references (mean: 0.010, median: 0, standard error: 0.003)
irrelevant information (mean: 0.134, median: 0, standard error:
0.013)
irrelevant references (mean: 0.016, median: 0, standard error:
0.005)
other issues. (mean: 0.238, median: 0, standard error: 0.019)
Please specify:
• How many references does the expert provide for the Wikipedia article?
(mean: 1.508, median: 0, standard error: 0.074)
• How many self-cited references does the expert provide for the Wikipedia
article? (mean: 0.374, median: 0, standard error: 0.032)
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• Rate the amount of effort needed to address the experts’ comments. (1 = cut
and paste; 7 = rewrite the entire article) (mean: 3.621, median: 4, standard
error: 0.057)
• Rate the amount of expertise needed to address the experts’ comments. (1
= high school AP economics classes; 7 = PhD in economics) (mean: 3.887,
median: 4, standard error: 0.057)
• How easily can the issues raised in the comment be located in the Wikipedia
article? (1 = unclear where to modify in the Wikipedia article; 7 = can
be identified at the sentence level) (mean: 4.572, median: 5, standard error:
0.061)
• Suppose you are to incorporate this expert’s comments. How helpful are
they? (1 = not helpful at all; 7 = very helpful) (mean: 4.121, median: 4,
standard error: 0.045)
• Please rate the overall quality of the comment. (1 = not helpful at all; 7 =
extremely helpful) (mean: 3.968, median: 4, standard error: 0.044)
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